final evaluation of the integrated regional stabilization of the lake chad basin phase i and phase ii – september 2017 – april 2020

final evaluation report

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| AU | African Union |
| AUC | African Union Commission |
| CBO | Community Based Organization |
| CJTF | Community Joint Task Force |
| CMI | Community Management Initiative |
| CO | Country Office |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| DDRRR | Disarmament, Demobilization Reinsertion, Rehabilitation and Reintegration |
| DIM | Direct Implementation Modality |
| ECCAS | Economic Community of Central African States |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of Western African States |
| ERG | Evaluation Reference Group |
| EU | European Union |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussions |
| ICRLCB | Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project |
| IP | Implementing Partner |
| IRSP | Integrated Regional Stabilization Strategy |
| LCB | Lake Chad Basin |
| LCBC | Lake Chad Basin Commission |
| LOE | Level of Effort |
| M&E | Monitoring and Evaluation |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| OCHA | Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| RBM | Results-Based Management |
| RSCA | Regional Service Center for Africa |
| RSS | Regional Stabilization Strategy |
| SDG | Sustainable Development Goal |
| SPRR | Screening, Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reintegration |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| TAP | Territorial Action Plan |
| ToC | Theory of Change |
| TOR | Terms of Reference |
| UFE | Utilization-Focused Evaluation |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |

Executive Summary

The *Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project* was conceived at a time when Boko Haram’s insurgency in North East Nigeria and in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger left over 10 million people displaced by 2017, with 1.8 million being internally displaced in Nigeria only. Since 2020, the situation continued to evolve, but not always in the right direction according to OCHA. The conflict in the affected areas also worsened the pre-existing issues of poverty, exclusion, and weak governance, which have been key drivers of the conflict. Also, conflict and displacement eroded the bonds and relationships between and within groups and communities.

At the regional level, cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin has been heavily affected by the Boko Haram insurgency, and institutions were not prepared to respond to the crisis. In response to it , the Security Council (SCR 2349, 2017) called upon regional governments to strengthen their cooperation and prioritization, as well as implementing a regional and coordinated strategy that would encompass disarmament, demobilization, de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration initiatives. Aligned with this philosophy, the UNDP’s conviction was that the improvement of community-level security services alone would not be sufficient and that a credible alternative pathway into a new civilian life was needed for Boko Haram defectors and surrendering fighters in order to sustainably tackle the Boko Haram phenomenon. In parallel of a much-needed humanitarian efforts led by OCHA and regional governments, the UNDP developed the vision of the *Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project,* with the objective to embark on a comprehensive stabilization approach. The ultimate goal of the project was to “*launch the establishment of foundations for longer-term recovery and development activities, implement immediate stabilization measures to address community-level security concerns in each of the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin, initiate a process of reconciliation and peace-building, rebuild local administrative structures and strengthen their ability to deliver, and support the process of de-radicalisation and reintegration of former fighters as well as the reintegration of former CJTF members and vigilantes while at the same time preparing and supporting receiving communities.*“

The strategy was orchestrated in two phases. Phase I started in September 2017 and ended in December 2018, with the objective of developing a common and regional approach to stabilization in the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin. The Regional Stabilization was to be promoted through the strengthening of community security, local governance, and reconciliation. Phase II started in January 2019 and ended in April 2020 with the same overall objectives as per Phase I: the reinforcement of community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration in targeted border communities to enhance regional stability. To reach this objective, the coordination of an implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko-Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin was strengthened. Phase I of the project started with a budget of 5,585,197.10 euros, equivalent to $ 6,568,646.43 USD, and Phase II had a budget of 6,264,726.51 USD.

The final evaluation of the two Phases of the strategy took place in Fall 2020 and was finalized in the early months of 2021. Its purpose was to assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, as well as gender of the project in fragile affected areas in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. A Matrix of evaluation was composed and presented to the evaluation reference group. A mixed-methods approach was adopted to adapt methods to the various information needs. The original evaluation was supposed to visit the four affected countries, but this could not take place as anticipated due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Instead, the evaluation took a different perspective and relied on in-depth documentary review and distanced semi-structured interviews to collect data from key stakeholders, which was somehow difficult due to various distance communication and technological reasons. In each country, with the support of the UNDP, the evaluation selected a list of key contacts and stakeholders that could usefully inform them. It also relied on some academic documentation as well as grey literature as a way to triangulate some of its findings. The evaluation faced some limitations: documentation, turnover of staff within each respective UNDP leading to a loss of institutional memory, lack of infrastructure and access to proper telecommunications for a great number of stakeholders, lack of some methodological tools (like perception surveys that could not be put in place by lack of time…).

Relevance

The evaluation believes that the Regional Stabilization plans is well aligned with the UNDP Strategic Plan as well as with the Sustainable Development Goals. Among other things, the UNDP Strategic Plan claims that “*if UNDP invests consistently in (…) infrastructures for peace and governance of things, via a combination of customized programmes, tools, engagements African countries will be better positioned to accelerate the attainment of the SDGs across the continent*”, which is exactly the spirit of the strategy. It also finds that the objectives of the program are well in line with the German Federal Foreign Office’s political aims. The Africa Policy Guidelines, in accordance with the Governments’ policies on “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building peace” states that “*with its stabilisation measures, the Federal Government supports political processes of conflict resolution (…), serve to create a secure environment, to improve living conditions in the short term and to offer alternatives to economies of war and violence*”; a philosophy that aligns with the Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Phase I and Phase II. These principles were also part of the commitments of Germany’s UN Security Council round from 2019 to 2020 to reinforce the UN’s cooperation with African partners on all issues regarding peace and security.

Moreover, the evaluation found that the regional approach put in place during the design of the program strategy allowed other UN agencies and actors to intervene and increase synergies between the project and other national initiatives. For instance, programming activities led by different UN agencies (UNDP, OIM, UNODC, UNICEF) in Nigeria on migration and internal-displacements issues, law-enforcement, and child protection and development, as well as the AU support, has been facilitating the implementation of the RSS. In Cameroun, the participation of OIM to the dialogue between actors encouraged local authorities to develop an adequate national strategy and to evolve towards the appropriation of the regional SPRR agenda.

The evaluation noted that the collaboration with local stakeholders was facilitated by different dialogue and consultative activities organized in the eight regions concerned by the project, and that through the implementation of various training and consultation activities, the project has been able to accompany the evolution of the political and legal processes for stabilization and reintegration process.

Finally, it was found that the integrated response to the RSS and community-based activities supported women empowerment throughout the stabilization process. However, projects’ interventions could have done more to better integrate the gender approach while dealing with decisional and administrative activities. Although women are seen as one of the leading community voices in the reintegration and reconciliation process, their role within the public administration instances is not very relevant; some of the UNDP training activities helped recon this problem.

Effectiveness

Despite the persistence of security issues in various areas, a vast majority of the program objectives have been attained within the proposed time frame by integrating a wide spectrum of local actors and other main stakeholders. The evaluation found that an increased communication between actors from local communities, international organizations and governments (local, regional and national) authorities has ensured a timely response to each of the program activities. While some of the interventions awaited the constitution of local intervention groups (case of Chad), the implementation of the proposed activities has been effective in their goal of reaching the most affected population. A specific chart in the Evaluation report presents most of the achievements (or non-) for each country with illustrative examples explaining how each expected output was successful or partially completed or achieved.

The support given by the UNDP across the region was not limited to the implementation of the Regional Stabilization Strategy (RSS) or the consolidation of a regional legal framework that would facilitate the DDR process. Other activities were carried out to improve the governance capacities of local authorities. In order to engage a participating approach on the SPRR process, populations and main community leaders needed to regain confidence in their representatives and in their capacity to manage resources and facilitate the implementation of the RSS. Other training and capacity building activities for governmental stakeholders allowed the creation of a common strategy for the SPRR orchestrated through the organization of different workshops and conferences[[1]](#footnote-2). These activities provided technical support to local authorities, magistrates and members of the police forces on how to incorporate rehabilitation, de-radicalization and reintegration practices in their approach towards their community and the BH ex-associates.

Major achievements through-out the two phases of the project were mostly associated to the integration of local and regional authorities into the UNDP’s strategy and the capacity of local actors to increase dialogue and cooperation across borders. Also, the commitments of community-based associations helped beyond the reintegration of the ex-associates and victims of BH violence, and ensured their participation in the economic development and the sustainability of the region. Local actors were engaged in the process of dialogue and reintegration of ex-associates and victims of BH, while giving them the necessary tools and knowledge to entertain future professional activities. As a result of these efforts, the perception study completed in Diffa (Niger) showed that despite the initial perception that local communities would not be receptive to the progressive reintegration of ex-associates and victims of Boko Haram, a majority of the respondents seemed ready to excuse and welcome them in their community.

Efficiency

Context and country-based specificities made partners and participating stakeholders vary from one region to another. Collaboration with local and national authorities has been depicted as a faster and more stable implementation facility than working with INGOs. Even if the participation of the local authorities varied from one region to another, and from one specific sector to another, their involvement with the program reduced the time required for the realization of the projects. Although the evaluation had limited access to financial programme and projects data, it is believed that it is through the leading role of the UNDP and its regional headquarters in each country of the LCB region that funding and funds flows were consistent and on time for the development of each intervention. A fluid communication with the regional UNDP office and the establishment of a calendar of funds disbursements made the implementation of some of the main activities possible. However, in times where UNDP’s teams were operating in highly dynamic environments, delays with the disbursement of donor’s funds became a real challenge. The lack of flexibility over the availability of funds and capacity to *carry over* some amounts from one year to another seemed to be the main liability through the funding allocation process during Phase I and II of the Stabilization Program. However, thanks to the increasing number of stakeholders and local partners participating in the achievement of the RSS, the program was proven to be efficient in many ways, notably by increasing the impact of every activity despite the limited resources.

Sustainability

The increased participation of local actors and regional authorities since the beginning of the program enhanced ownership and sustainability of the interventions. Although the program facilitated the improvement of the condition of several infrastructures within the LCB region, the major lasting impact is the participation of the population in the process of reconstructing and consolidating peace and stability in the region. Through continuous consultations and training of Government’s authorities and civil society actors, it is believed that local authorities and community actors will be well positioned to continue the process initiated with the contribution of the German Federal Foreign Office.

In conclusion, the RSS established a solid framework for a wide spectrum of actors invited to participate to the stabilization process within the LCB region. The UNDP enhanced the inclusion of different local stakeholders in every activity and decisional process, which allowed an increased number of communities and population to be reached. Stakeholders’ participation in the different projects, activities and interventions ensured ownership and sustainability of the projects results. Furthermore, the increasing synergies between community actors, religious leaders, population, and government stakeholders favored inclusion in future governmental strategies and policies affecting these precise communities. In many cases, administrative authorities participating in the implementation of the activities mobilized additional actors and increased the number of direct beneficiaries reached. To reach the stabilization goals listed in the RSS, the active engagement of government stakeholders facilitated not only the implementation of the strategy but should also ensure sustainability results over time.

FINAL EVALUATION REPORT

# Introduction

With the support of the German Government, UNDP developed and implemented the Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin project, in four countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria). The phase I of the project started in September 2017 and ended in December 2018 with a budget of Euros 5,585,197.10 equivalent of $ 6,568,646.43, and the Phase II started in January 2019 to end in March 2020 with a budget of Euro 6,264,726.51

The purpose of the final evaluation of the Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin project is to assess the results achieved since 2017 and to analyse the overall added value to stabilization in the Lake Chad Basin. The evaluation will be used for learning and accountability.

The *Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project* was designed at a time when Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria and neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger had left over 10 million people displaced by 2017 with 1.8 million being internally displaced in Nigeria, and approximately 155,000 Nigerians as refugees. The conflict has also resulted in massive destruction of basic infrastructure, health and educational facilities, commercial buildings, private houses and agricultural assets. The current conflict has also worsened the pre-existing issues of poverty, exclusion, weak governance, which are key drivers of the conflict. Following 2014, conflict and displacement have eroded, and in some cases ruptured, the bonds and relationships between and within groups and communities. A large part of the population, especially women and children, in the Lake Chad Basis have experienced violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, and multiple human rights violations. Levels of violence, as measured in frequency and density, is highest in Nigeria, followed by Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

Also, despite the efforts of the military, community security in the Lake Chad Basin has been, and continued to be one of the key challenges in the region since local security structures including community-level policing was partially affected (in Chad), strongly affected in Cameroon and Niger and to a large extend destroyed in Nigeria. As a response, community and area-based vigilante groups in various shapes and forms organically grew over the years to provide a minimum of security to the population. When the project was initiated there was an estimated number of 26,000 vigilantes across the basin, most of which operating in Northeast Nigeria and belong to the semi-formalized Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). Facing all these critical problems, UNDP’s conviction was that the improvement of community-level security services alone, however, will not have the required overall impact and that a credible alternative pathway into a different, civilian life was needed for Boko Haram defectors and surrendering fighters in order to sustainably tackle the Boko Haram phenomenon. This required supporting reintegration at multiple levels - the individual, family, community, national and regional, and paying attention to its multi-faceted dimensions – economic, social psychosocial and political. It also required equal support to former fighters and the receiving communities (50/50 approach).

The *Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project* vision was to embark on a comprehensive stabilization approach to start addressing grievances and contribute to ending the spiral of insecurity, forced displacement and conflict. UNDP project’s vision was to “*launch the establishment of foundations for longer-term recovery and development activities, implement immediate stabilization measures to address community-level security concerns in each of the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin, initiate a process of reconciliation and peace-building, rebuild local administrative structures and strengthen their ability to deliver, and support the process of de-radicalisation and reintegration of former fighters as well as the reintegration of former CJTF members and vigilantes while at the same time preparing and supporting receiving communities.* “

The evaluation report will present a short description of the intervention, will review evaluation scope and objectives as well as the approach and the methods implemented to answer the questions of the evaluation which will be presented as Findings. Later, conclusions, and lessons learned will conclude the report.

The draft report of the evaluation will be presented to the Steering Committee and to other stakeholders. Feedback from the presentation and reviews by key stakeholders will be shared with the evaluator for the finalisation of the report. Comments and changes by the evaluator in response to the draft report will be retained by the evaluator to show how they have addressed comments.

# Description of the intervention

## Background of the mandate

### An endless deteriorating situation

The *Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project* was designed at a time when Boko Haram insurgency in North East Nigeria and neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Chad and Niger had left over 10 million people displaced by 2017 with 1.8 million being internally displaced in Nigeria, and approximately 155,000 Nigerians as refugees. The conflict has also resulted in massive destruction of basic infrastructure, health and educational facilities, commercial buildings, private houses, and agricultural assets. Since 2020, the situation has continuously continued to evolve, but not yet in the right direction according to humanitarian statistics provided by OCHA.

Table ‎2.1: Evolution of the humanitarian situation in the four countries (2017 to 2020), (OCHA[[2]](#footnote-3))

|  | Country | NE Nigeria | Chad | Cameroon | Niger |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Affected population (2017) | 14,000,000 | 4,700,000 | 2,900,000 | 1,900,000 |
| 2 | Affected population (2020) | 13,000,000[[3]](#footnote-4) (<) | 6,300,000 (>) | 7,900,000 (>) | 2,9 M (>) |
| 3 | No. of refugees (2017) | 200,000 (returning refugees) | 389,000 | 363,000 (86K from Nigeria) | 149,000 (84K from Nigeria) |
| 4 | No. of refugees (2020) | 1,6 M (returning refugees) (>) | 468 K (>) refugees  117 K returnees | 419 K refugees 321 K returnees | 218 K (>)  30 K returnees |
| 5 | No of IDPs (2017) | 1,825,321 | 118,804 | 228,443 | 127,499 |
| 6 | No of IDPs (2020) | 1,900,000 (>) | 171 K (>) | 977 K (297 K in Far North (12/19) (>) | 187 K (>) |

Northeast **Nigeria[[4]](#footnote-5)** hosts the bulk of active Boko Haram fighters, and of vigilantes, estimated in 2017 at approximately 15,600 to 20,000. As a result of the armed conflict and ongoing Boko Haram attacks, local governance structures have become dysfunctional and civil servants displaced. Access to Justice and community security have been similarly compromised, and lowest compared to the 3 other LCB countries. In **Chad**, since 2014, local authorities and communities have been facing a massive influx of IDPs and refugees with displaced people doubling the local population in the district of Baga Sola and Bol localities. With 118,804 displaced populations in 2017, a number which never stopped increasing, the region continued to suffer from insecurity as well as intercommunity tensions and pressure over scarce resources in an already extremely poor region, which lacks basic services and infra-structure. At the same time, humanitarian and development access have been generally satisfactory and best compared to the 3 other LCB countries, Boko Haram related violence and attacks being more sporadic and of low density. Local governance structures are mostly in place and function, and access to justice only partially affected by the crisis. But the closing of borders with neighbouring countries has significantly hampered the cross-border trade, thus eroding the already reduced means of livelihoods.

In **Cameroon**, the high concentration of IDPs, refugees and returnees in the Far North region - the poorest in the country – has for years put pressure on economic activities and social cohesion and has jeopardized peace and resilience within communities. Border communities in the Lake Chad Basin are significantly affected by the crisis, putting a strain on local economies. The level of violence in Cameroon was then considered to be the second highest of the four LCB countries, local governance structures have become partially dysfunctional due to violent attacks and community security low in the target areas. In **Niger**’s Diffa region, security measures undertaken by the government in response to the Boko Haram insurgency resulted in the relocation of more than 200,000 people, which have been cut off from their primary livelihoods. This number never stopped growing up while access to socioeconomic services such as education, health, clean and potable water, as well as local and trans-border markets was seriously impacted. Community security, social cohesion and resilience, as well as human rights are undermined, hindering peace, security and the development of the region.

The current conflict has also worsened the pre-existing issues of poverty, exclusion, weak governance, which are key drivers of the conflict. Following 2014, conflict and displacement have eroded, and in some cases ruptured, the bonds and relationships between and within groups and communities. Intra-communal structures and processes that traditionally regulated violence and resolved conflicts have been weakened. Therefore, vulnerable groups in the Lake Chad Basis, especially youth, have been much more receptive to messages of radicalization and ideology combined with the promise of a purpose and socio-economic empowerment. A large part of the population, especially women and children, in the Lake Chad Basin have experienced violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, and multiple human rights violations. Levels of violence, as measured in frequency and density, is highest in Nigeria, followed by Cameroon, Niger and Chad.

Also, despite the efforts of the military, community security in the Lake Chad Basin has been, and continued to be one of the key challenges in the region since local security structures including community-level policing was partially affected (in Chad), strongly affected in Cameroon and Niger and to a large extend destroyed in Nigeria. As a response, community and area-based vigilante groups in various shapes and forms organically grew over the years to provide a minimum of security to the population. When the project was initiated there was an estimated number of 26,000 vigilantes across the basin, most of which operating in Northeast Nigeria and belong to the semi-formalized Civilian Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).

### UNDP’s response

At the regional level, cooperation in the Lake Chad Basin has been heavily affected by the Boko Haram insurgency and the ensuing food crisis, and institutions were not prepared to respond to the crisis. This is partially due to the fact that the four countries belong to two separate regional bodies (ECOWAS; ECCAS), and partially due to the fact that the only existing institution spanning the four countries, the Lake Chad Basin Commission – which capacities were mostly focused to ensure effective and collaborative water resources management – was not mandated to comprehensively address the root causes of the crisis. In support of the LCB and considering the need of a stronger security-sector and military cooperation in the region, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)[[5]](#footnote-6) was established in 1994, which mandate was later expanded and strengthened to encompass counter-terrorism activities. In 2012 and further 2015, the MNJTF mandate was expanded and strengthened to encompass counter-terrorism activities

Facing all these critical problems, UNDP’s conviction was that the improvement of community-level security services alone, however, will not have the required overall impact and that a credible alternative pathway into a different, civilian life was needed for Boko Haram defectors and surrendering fighters to sustainably tackle the Boko Haram phenomenon. UNDP has a long experience in dealing with the reintegration of former fighters[[6]](#footnote-7). It is not only crucial to offer a way out for members of armed groups such as the Boko Haram as well as self-defence groups/’vigilantes’, but that these reintegration initiatives need to be anchored in broader stabilization efforts. This requires supporting reintegration at multiple levels - the individual, family, community, national and regional, and paying attention to its multi-faceted dimensions – economic, social psychosocial and political. It also requires equal support to former fighters and the receiving communities (50/50 approach). Also, in contexts where peace agreements are lacking and transitional justice mechanism are not formally agreed, attention to the legal framework that will underpin reintegration efforts as well as careful risk analysis and mitigation measures are fundamental. The four Basin countries needed to be supported to develop a common approach to de-radicalization and reintegration of surrendering fighters, based on a shared concept, common standards, and a common legal framework. Base country-level approaches to demobilization, de-radicalization and reintegration on common standards in the four countries should be aligned to relevant international standards, especially the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) and relevant Human Rights standards, as well as to the specific needs in the Lake Chad Basin.

Also, the insufficient presence of state authorities in Lake Chad areas, especially in Chad in the island areas, was considered as one driving factors which facilitated the expansion of Boko Haram activities. The restoration of state authorities and security forces could play a decisive role in the stabilization process in the region. Promoting an effective border management and encouraging a permanent dialogue between security/defense forces and the civil population could facilitate the restoration of the confidence in the public administration and local governance as well in defense and security forces.

In conclusion, while humanitarian assistance will continuously be required (as the OCHA statistics presented earlier demonstrate it) to address immediate needs and tackle the food crisis, the *Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project* vision was to embark on a comprehensive stabilization approach to start addressing grievances and contribute to ending the spiral of insecurity, forced displacement and conflict. UNDP project’s vision was to “*launch the establishment of foundations for longer-term recovery and development activities, implement immediate stabilization measures to address community-level security concerns in each of the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin, initiate a process of reconciliation and peace-building, rebuild local administrative structures and strengthen their ability to deliver, and support the process of de-radicalisation and reintegration of former fighters as well as the reintegration of former CJTF members and vigilantes while at the same time preparing and supporting receiving communities.* “

Figure .: UNDP’s overall approach to stabilization[[7]](#footnote-8)



To ensure effectiveness and sustainability, the proposed programme would enhance cooperation between affected regions across borders and in close cooperation with local governmental structures and regional institutions (AU, LCBC, MNJTF, ECOWAS, ECCAS). This would require a common strategy and action plan agreed between the four countries and supported by the regional institutions. This approach is aligned with the recommendations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2349 of 2017[[8]](#footnote-9), which, inter-alia, recommended to:

* Help build and sustain peace by addressing the root causes of the conflict and *calls upon* respective governments to strengthen their coordination and prioritization (para 23);
* Support early recovery activities and long-term investment in vital services (…) and the rule of law (para 24);
* Support the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to develop a comprehensive and common strategy that effectively address the drivers that contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram (…);
* Acknowledge the important contribution of civil society, in particular women’s and youth organizations (…) and to encourage greater dialogue between respective Governments and civil society;
* Encourage Governments in the Region (..) to develop and implement a regional and coordinated strategy that encompasses transparent inclusive, human-rights compliant disarmament, demobilisation, de-radicalization, rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives (…) for persons associated with Boko Haram (…);
* Pay particular attention to the treatment and reintegration of women and children formerly associated with Boko Haram and ISIL (para 30).

Based on these principles, UNDP designed the *Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project* in close collaboration with the national governments and local authorities of the Lake Chad Basin, as well as with international development partners, with the overarching goal to stabilize the Lake Chad Basin and to begin establishing the foundations for recovery and development. Its three mutually dependent objectives are to[[9]](#footnote-10):

1. Support the 4 countries / governments / local authorities to develop and launch a common, **regional approach to stabilization** between the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin, including cross-border processes of reconciliation and prevention of violent extremism;
2. Promote regional stability through strengthening of **community security, local governance and peace building** / reconciliation and prevention of violent extremism in 20 critical border communities; and
3. Support **reintegration of former vigilantes and people associated with BH (including surrendering fighters)** **and victims** into crisis-affected communities of the Lake Chad Basin, while preparing and equally supporting receiving communities.

The strategy and the activities of Phase II of the Regional strategy was preceded by a first preparatory phase. Phase I, in 2017 and the first half of 2018, saw an intensive process of consultations to understand needs, gather opinions and perceptions, and consolidate stakeholder views and recommendations in areas relevant to the Phase I project document, such as community-security, prevention of violent extremism and de-radicalisation, local governance, and reconciliation and reintegration. The consultations were conducted to ensure needs-based interventions and to ensure the voice of the communities was present in key events.[[10]](#footnote-11) After these initial consultations, the first Governors’ Forum that took place at Maiduguri in May 2018, supported by the German Government, gathered nine governors from the four countries with over 150 stakeholders representing national institutions, multilateral and bilateral partners, as well as civil society from the region. They all shared perspectives on stabilisation, peacebuilding and sustainable development. The Forum is expected remain as a regional platform to foster regional cooperation on the same issues. The result of these consultations led to the drafting of the Regional Strategy for Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin, which was adopted in August 2018. The approach, supported by UNDP National offices, has enabled both the active involvement of authorities at the central level (ministries of the interior, justice, decentralisation) and a real appropriation by the local authorities.

While some Phase I activities had been concluded most of them could only be completed during Phase II implementation, which took place from January 2019 to March 2020 and the overall budget approved to roughly Euro 6.1 million. Phase II of the programme has also been guided by the Regional Strategy and activities have been defined keeping in mind the upcoming Regional Stabilisation Facility.

# Evaluation scope and objectives

## Scope and objectives

**The phase I started in September 2017 and ended in December 2018** with Overall Objective of stabilizing the Lake Chad and establishing foundations for recovery and development. The project had three specific objectives:

**Specific Objective 1:** A common, regional approach to stabilization launched in the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin

**Specific Objective 2:** Regional Stabilization promoted through strengthening of community security, local governance and reconciliation

**Specific Objective 3:** Reintegration of former fighters, CJTF members and vigilantes supported

**The Phase II started in January 2019 and ended in April 2020** with the same overall objective as phase I the following expected results:

**Specific Objective 1:** Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened.

**Specific Objective 2:** Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation, and reintegration in targeted border communities are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability

## Evaluation criteria

The evaluation covered the OECD-DAC criteria of **relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability** and assessed the **key factors** that have contributed to achievement or non-achievement of the intended results.

## Evaluation questions

The questions of the evaluation are presented in the Matrix of evaluation presented in Annex 2.

Based on initial interviews with regional stakeholders, the questions have been consolidated to try to answer in an effective manner to each of them. Here is a summary of the number of questions related to each criterion:

| Criteria | Number of Questions | Number of sub-questions |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Relevance | 5 | 12 |
| Effectiveness | 3 | 11 |
| Efficiency | 3 | 11 |
| Sustainability | 3 | 13 |
| **Total** | **14** | **47** |

# Evaluation approach and methods

The evaluation has designed an evaluation approach that relies on the principles of utility and participation, with the inherent limits of being far away from the areas of implementation of the strategy as well as from main stakeholders.

## Evaluation approach

Guided by a set of evaluation standards, the design and conduct of the evaluation has been utilisation-focused, participatory, and followed a range of mixed-methods aimed at providing a systematic, integrated and coherent analysis of the Lake Basin Regional Stabilization Strategy (RSS).

**Utilization-Focused Evaluation (UFE):** The evaluation adopted a UFE approach to respond to the specific purposes and intended uses of the evaluation (i.e., providing accountability and learning, and contributing to future efforts of all relevant political and technical stakeholders of the RSS throughout the Lake Chad Basin). The main objective of UFE approach is to be useful to its intended users.

**Participatory approach:** In line with the UFE approach, the evaluation worked closely with the LCBC Secretariat, the four UNDP offices involved, the ERG, as well as other relevant stakeholders interested in the success of the RSS. Pursuing a participatory approach increases the quality of data collected (e.g. through interviews, questionnaires) and enhances the credibility of the process and its findings.

**Mixed-methods:** The purpose of the mixed-methods approach is to adapt methods to the various information needs and, in so doing, collect and triangulate different data sources through both quantitative and qualitative techniques in order to ensure a comprehensive, robust, and evidence-based assessment. This will in in turn allows for the development of insightful findings, reliable conclusions, relevant lessons learned, and targeted recommendations. More details are provided below.

## Data sources

Systematic desk review of key documents provided by UNDP and other partners (Strategies, Phase I and II reports, agreements, National reports/reviews, M&E data, publications, etc.) to assess LCB RSS relevance, effectiveness, etc. based on the evaluation matrix questions and sub-questions. A presentation of the bibliography consulted is in Annex 4.

## Data collection procedures and instruments

The evaluation designed a comprehensive methodology that addressed each objective and evaluation criteria in a time-bound and transparent manner, thereby ensuring an appropriate participation of key stakeholders.

| Method | description | phases |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Preliminary Desk Review** | Review the body of documentation provided by UNDP COs to assess data sources, quantity, quality, and completeness, identify main gaps and measures to address them. | Home based Inception Phase |
| **Initial interviews with ERG and UNDP** | The hopes to discuss assignment objectives, uses and users in line with the UFE approach, as well as methodology and workplan, sources of data, etc. |
| **Evaluation Matrix** | Once previous steps are complete and the scope refined, the evaluator finalizes the matrix (key questions, sub-questions, indicators, data collection and analysis tools). |
| **In-depth Document Review** | Systematic desk review of key documents provided by UNDP and other partners (Strategies, Phase I and II reports, agreements, National reports/reviews, M&E data, publications, etc.) to assess LCB RSS relevance, effectiveness, etc. based on the evaluation matrix questions and sub-questions | Home-based Data Collection Phase |
| **Skype/Zoom/**  **WhatsApp/semi-structured interviews** | Intended to collect qualitative data from key stakeholders (UNDP, donor, IP, LCBC Secretariat) to complete the desk review. In-depth interviews are conducted with key informants identified to explore specific issues (i.e. governance, strategies, sustainability, etc...) or to focus on specific areas that emerge from the desk review and interviews. |
| **Specific Questionnaires to selected officials** | Face-to-face virtual interviews may be difficult to organize, then the proposal to send some sets of written questionnaires to some selected program/policy officials who may accept sharing their views through a more reflexive (and confidential) manner. |
| **Debriefing to the ERG** | The evaluator will debrief the ERG of the state of advancement of his documentary review, interviews with UNDP/Government/Other stakeholders officials and the challenges he had (or has still) to address | Data Collection Phase |
| **Data management** | The evaluator aggregates and triangulates data per question and indicators based on the evaluation matrix and data sources obtained. | Data analysis phase |
| **Data reporting** | The evaluator prepares and submits Draft Final and Final report, with presentation of findings organized according to the evaluation criteria, findings, conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations. He will integrate relevant comments received from the ERG and then finalize the evaluation report | Reporting phase |
| **Restitution** | It will depend on UNDP to decide of the format of the final presentation of the report to Governmental, UN and other stakeholders’ representations (place, date, format, technology, etc.) | Conclusion phase |
| **Administration and edition of the report** | The evaluator will manage the editorial control of the Draft and Final Inception and Final Evaluation reports, as well as the technical management of all communications with all interviewees as well as with the ERG and evaluation focal point | Throughout the evaluation |

## Matrix of Evaluation

The Matrix of Evaluation which is presented in Annex 2 is composed of 16 central questions (5 questions for Relevance, 3 questions for Effectiveness, 3 questions for Efficiency and 5 questions for Sustainability and Continuity). Each central question is supported by an average to 3 to 5 sub-questions, each supported by one or two specific indicators. Relying on initial documentary review and further discussions with the ERG, the evaluation has reorganized the questions in a way that a good number of sub-questions will help determining with strong evidence answers to key central questions under the four criteria of the evaluation.

## Stakeholder participation

Participation of main stakeholders was limited to the number of persons that could be reached from outside. The Inception report presented a list of contacts and stakeholders for the four countries, with national and international staff. Some lists of contacts were extensive and gathered all, if not most, of the local/national stakeholders that participated to the implementation of the regional strategy at their national/provincial/commune level.

For each country, and with the support of UNDP Country Offices, it was decided to select a grid of 10 relevant contacts that could usefully inform the evaluation. As such the evaluation was able to speak virtually with UNDP CO or Field Programme Managers, national political or technical authorities, (regional/technical) as well as some beneficiaries.

A list of the persons that the evaluation was able to reach out is presented in Annex 3.

## Ethical considerations

During its implementation, the evaluation followed the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) Norms and Standards for Evaluation, e.g.:

* **Utility** – it is the objective of the evaluation that resulting analysis, conclusions or recommendations should inform decisions and actions;
* **Credibility** – the evaluation was grounded on independence, impartiality, and a thorough methodology (as far as it could go in consideration of the constraints generated by the Covid-19)
* **Independence** – the evaluator remained impartial and free from undue pressure throughout the evaluation process;
* **Impartiality** – impartiality was guaranteed at all stages of the evaluation process, particularly in the conduct and formulation of findings and recommendations.
* **Ethics** – evaluation was conducted by respecting the highest standards of integrity and respect for the beliefs, manners and customs of the social and cultural environment;
* **Transparency** – transparency with the ERG and stakeholders established trust, built confidence and increased public accountability;
* **Human rights and gender equality** – values and principles of human rights and gender equality were integrated into all stages of the evaluation, underpinning the commitment to the principle of “no-one left behind”;
* **Professionalism** - key aspects included access to knowledge; education and training; adherence to ethics and to these norms and standards; utilization of evaluation competencies; and recognition of knowledge, skills and experience.

## Background information on the evaluator

The Terms of Reference of the evaluation required the services of an international firm with extensive experience of conducting improvement and accountability evaluations in stabilization and post conflict recovery programmes. The COVID-19 pandemic made it impossible to consider the deployment of such a qualified and structured team. Therefore, UNDP selected the services of M. Yvan Conoir.

Mr. Conoir is a senior consultant with 30 years of experience in International Evaluation, Humanitarian assistance, Peacekeeping/peacebuilding, DDR/SSR, and Academic Teaching. He and has extensive knowledge of Evaluation techniques RBM programming/operations, Institutional and Organizational Assessment and Strategic diagnosis/planning. Over the past 13 years, Mr. Conoir has led major evaluations in over 60 countries worldwide for the World Bank, OCHA, UNHCR, UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNV, UN-DPKO, CIDA, EU, OAS, Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Canada, France, Switzerland and other private entities.

Throughout his career, M. Conoir proved to have a sound understanding of evaluation principles and methodologies, including capacity in range of qualitative and qualitative evaluation methods. He has research and implementation expertise in stabilization and post conflict recovery, as well as awareness on gender, social and conflict analysis in evaluation. As a peacekeeping and peacebuilding expert, he has evaluated various programs with MINUSTAH, ONUCI, MONUSCO, ONUB, UNTAET and various other peacebuilding initiatives in Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Haiti, Colombia, Ecuador, Afghanistan…

Mr. Conoir holds a Diploma from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (Geneva), an MBA in International Management, a MA in Political Sciences and has published a series of books on Humanitarian Operations, Peacebuilding, DDR and Project Management of International Aid (<https://www.pulaval.com/auteurs/yvan-conoir>). He is teaching at the Université Laval (Québec) and the Université de Montreal.

## Major limitations of the methodology

An evaluation covering four national strategies and plans of action as well as the development of a regional strategy presented certain particular challenges, which have been:

Table ‎4.1: Challenges and mitigation strategies

| Challenges | Mitigation Strategies |
| --- | --- |
| Lack of **adequate documentation** received in due time. The TOR refer to series of documents which may not be shared in due time or may be incomplete | The evaluator worked with the **LCBC Secretariat and UNDP COs** to **collect all the reports and information available** |
| Some **methodological tools** – like perception surveys - that the projects (Phase I and Phase II) were anticipating undertaking may not be available (not enough time to be put in place, not finalized, data incomplete…) | Perception surveys are key to assess the thoughts and behavioral changes of respective authorities, communities, or individuals (for instance ex-combatants). There was a **limited number of perception surveys** as most of the target countries did not have time to produce them in due time. |
| **Turnover of staff** within each respective UNDP and IP office will generate loss of institutional and program memory which will in turn affect the quality, quantity or relevance of the information provided | The evaluator faced this challenge with some senior international or national officers. Trying **to reach out some of the persons who had key positions proved to be problematic** and did not give many results. |
| **Lack of infrastructure** and access to telecommunications such as email, electricity, Wi-Fi for stakeholders who may be in remote areas | **The evaluation generated** text messages, WhatsApp, Skype and Phone calls with respective stakeholders |
| **Lack of interest** - or willingness to undergo an interview session - of persons presented for interviews by any UNDP CO in the LCB region | The evaluation maintained a **close level of communication** with respective country managers to assess on a case-by-case basis how further proposed contacts could be “reanimated” |
| **Covid-19 pandemic –** The Covid-19 pandemic imposed strict rules for travelers that made it difficult for the evaluator to be personally present for the final presentation of the conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations of the final report | UNDP and the evaluator used all possible **IT tools** to set up an adequate presentation of the final conclusions, LL and recommendations of the final report |

# Data analysis

Data analysis relied on the triangulation of available data from each national country namely UNDP reports, implementing partners reports and individual interviews undertaken with each national or international staff in their respective countries. Whenever possible, the evaluation reviewed sources of academic or grey literature in order to support some of its findings. The Findings follow the structure of the Matrix of evaluation. Without any field visit and lack of observation, it is obvious that some of the findings may not fully adequately reflect the reality on the ground and this remains a serious limitation.

# Findings

**RELEVANCE**

1. The Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin is aligned with the UNDP Strategic Plan as well as with the SDGs (Q 1.1)
2. The **vision** of the UNDP Strategic Plan is “*to help countries achieve sustainable development by eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, accelerating structural transformations for sustainable development and building resilience to shocks*”. For this undertaking, UNDP supports “*innovative platforms that strengthen collaboration with Governments as well as with civil society*” and promotes “*"whole-of-society" responses vital for transformational change*” to achieve the 2030 Agenda. To respond to national and regional disasters and crises, “*Governments require support in their efforts to return to sustainable development pathways, while increasing their abilities to proactively manage risk”* and strengthen resilience to future crises. Through its “Signature solution 3[[11]](#footnote-12)”, UNDP aims at supporting “*recovery capacities for resilient societies harness the UNDP developmental approach and expertise across the issues of conflict prevention and peacebuilding*”. The focus will be on work with Governments, host communities and humanitarian and peacebuilding actors to help affected populations minimize the long-term impact of crises. In countries facing humanitarian emergencies, conflict and post-conflict situations, the creation of platforms can also facilitate greater cooperation and complementarity across development, humanitarian and sustaining peace efforts.
3. In Africa, the **mission** of the UNDP Renewed Strategic Offer[[12]](#footnote-13) is to enable the acceleration of Sustainable Development Goals in Africa in the Decade of Action. The Strategic Offer aims to strengthen UNDP’s position as Africa’s premier enabler and integrator for the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and the 2063 Agenda. The Offer comes from the evidence that in various parts of the continent (notably the Sahel, Central Africa, the Horn of Africa and **the Lake Chad Basin**) violent conflicts quickly become regional crises that decimate communities, reverse development and deter investment. Like in other regions of Africa (Horn of Africa, Sahel), the Lake Chad Basin is part of a common uptake in violent conflict, and African countries dealing with this reality need to develop new tools and partnerships to address these new threats. UNDP’s value proposition is guided by a theory of change, which is grounded in the UNDP Strategic Plan, and which, among other things claims that “*If UNDP invests consistently in (…)* ***infrastructures for peace and governance of things****, via a combination of customized programmes, tools, engagements African countries will be better positioned to accelerate the attainment of the SDGs across the continent*”.
4. Particular elements of the new Strategic offer[[13]](#footnote-14) are well aligned with the RSS, such as: a) the promotion of regional initiatives; b) the creation of partnerships to support PVE strategies, particularly in developing counter-narratives to hate speech and radicalization; and c) the development of programs that highlight and engage youth and women as agents of change and champions of peace and stability.
5. The RSS is also well in lien with the promotion of Sustainable Development Goals, particularly
   1. SDG 16 – Significantly reduce all forms of violence; Strengthen relevant national institutions for building capacity at all levels, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime (Aligned to Strategic Pillar 8, on PVE and Building Peace, Pillar 3, DDRRR of BK Associates and Pillar 5, Governance);
   2. SDG 5 – Gender Equality, (Aligned to Strategic Pillars 7 and 9 of the Strategy)
   3. SDG 17 – Partnerships for the Goals (Which supports Pillar 1, Political Cooperation and Pillar 3, Security and Human Rights);
6. The development of the Regional Stabilisation Strategy also demonstrates the commitment by LCB Member States, African Union Commission (AUC) and the Lake Chad Basin Commission to strengthen the cooperation between regional and international actors in combating Boko Haram and protection civilians. In this regard, the Stabilisation Strategy serves to achieve the AU’s aspiration to Silence the Guns[[14]](#footnote-15) by 2020. The AUC Peace and Security Commissioner believe that the AU Agenda 2063 and the SDG 2030 lay the foundation for the creation of conditions necessary for sustainable peace and development in the LCB Region, based on the key guiding principles that support the regional strategy: national and regional ownership, mutual accountability, cooperation and complementarity, mutually reinforcing partnership, transformative approaches to stabilisation development, gender mainstreaming, respect for regional, continental and international human rights instruments, and capacity building for effective service delivery to the affected populations of the region[[15]](#footnote-16). During the annual meetings, and posterior encounters and discussions between governors, there was a unanimous agreement that achieving regional stability would demand “*addressing the many complex root causes of the Boko Haram insurgency and various factors that enable instability*”[[16]](#footnote-17): “The RSS provides a vital framework within which to address these many complex and urgent challenges.”[[17]](#footnote-18)
7. The objectives of the programme are well in line with the German Federal Foreign Office’s political aims (Q 1.2)
8. German Africa policy takes in the entire spectrum of foreign policy tools to prevent crises and instability, such as crisis prevention, stabilisation, development cooperation and economic development. The Africa Policy Guidelines are geared to the Federal Government’s guidelines “Preventing Crises, Resolving Conflicts, Building Peace”[[18]](#footnote-19). The guidelines stipulate that “*with its stabilisation measures, the Federal Government supports political processes of conflict resolution (…), serve to create a secure environment, to improve living conditions in the short term and to offer alternatives to economies of war and violence*”. The Federal Government aims at “*making sure that its stabilisation measures are compatible with the more long-term support of structural and social processes of change aimed at creating sustainable prospects for people’s lives and future in states and regions affected by crisis and conflict*.” It also notes that “*Local peace infrastructures can provide a sustainable base for incipient reconciliation processes and advance peaceful conflict management processes*”.
9. All these statements are in line with the philosophy and the objectives of the Integrated regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Phase I and Phase II. Moreover, they participate to the commitments of Germany’s UN Security Council round from 2019 to 2020 to strengthen the UN’s cooperation with African partners on all issues regarding peace and security, as well as the new level of cooperation between the European Union and Africa. According to Germany, “*the European-African partnership is essential to the implementation of the Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*.”[[19]](#footnote-20)
10. The increasing role played by the UNDP offices’ through the two phases of the program in each one of the regions of the LCB generated a strong link of confidence with local authorities, religious leaders and community chiefs and eased their engagement and assistance during the realization of the different activities in Phase II. (Q. 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 1.4.1, 1.5.1)
11. In a general perspective UNDP has long-time demonstrated global leadership and intervening capacity in early recovery and stabilization processes across the world and the implementation of the two phases of the present program was no exception. Starting with a leader role through Phase I, UNDP offices across the four countries have been able to support the establishment of a regional participative framework that helped to “*guide an integrated and regional response to the crisis*”[[20]](#footnote-21). The intervention during Phase I could be then analyzed in two times. At the early stage of this Phase UNDP offices ensured horizontal alignment and integration across the region to bring key stakeholders from across the four countries together[[21]](#footnote-22). Regional meetings and focus groups[[22]](#footnote-23) set the stage for the organization of the regional Lake Chad Basin Governors’ Forum in 2018 at Maiduguri that led to the establishment of the RSS. Thus, the implementation of a coordination mechanism among the four UNDP Country Offices, and the meeting in N’Djamena in November 2017, supported regional coordination and implementation of future activities.
12. At the operational level, UNDP offices and stakeholders’ network helped to identify main needs and intervention sectors within the target communities while encouraging other activities linked with counter-insurgency efforts. As an illustration, the implementation of inter-community dialogues and forums in cooperation with the CELIAF in Liwa, Baga-Sola and Bo between October and December 2018, mapped main public services and operational facilities within the most affected areas of the conflict. Subsequently 33 targeted communities across the Lake Chad Basin and more than 3800 vigilante and security officials received capacity-building and specific training for the development of their surveillance activities[[23]](#footnote-24) and their capacity to participate in the future reintegration process for ex-associates of BH.
13. During Phase II, the role played by UNDP offices evolved as much as their communication and exchanges with governmental authorities increased. RSS sensitization activities were held in each one of the countries in order to promote the fundamentals of the strategy while bringing together members of the public sector, religious communities, civil society and international organizations. In addition to the CJTF members training activities held during the Phase I, UNDP offices enhanced the capacities of local authorities and civil society groups during the process of developing harmonized national policies and approaches for SPRR of ex-BH associates and the reintegration of BH victims. While consolidation of these activities and effective implementation of the RSS at a national level are now meant to be fully achieved, and succeeded by the Facility[[24]](#footnote-25), the organization of the *Civil society consultation forum* in June 2019 is an example of the technical support provided to the LCBC through the policies and intervention harmonization process[[25]](#footnote-26).
14. The regional approach put in place during the design of the program strategy allowed other UN agencies and actors to intervene and increase synergies between the project and other national initiatives. (Q.1.1.3, 1.1.4, 1.1.5)
15. The implementation of the regional approach and development of specific policies for the management of Boko Haram ex-associates and victims required full cooperation among local actors and authorities, but mostly among UN agencies and other main international actors. For instance, one of the main challenges of the RSS has been the establishment of a regional policy guideline for DDR. While some of the countries’ legal framework encouraged the surrender of former Boko Haram fighters with a possibility of reintegration, the death penalty established in 2014 in Cameroon had the opposite effect[[26]](#footnote-27). Under such conditions, the intervention of the IOM and UNDP offices for the development of a better understanding of the benefits of a more comprehensive legal framework for DDR encouraged the Government of Cameroon to review their legislation and prepare a new system of reintegration for ex-associates that surrender[[27]](#footnote-28).
16. The International Bar Association also participated in the process of creating a sub-technical committee that addressed the crisis in the Far-North Region allowing a better identification of local stakeholders, to look out on their roles and responsibilities and secure compliance with the RSS[[28]](#footnote-29). Although some government ministries and administrations have been major partners of these initiatives in all four countries, the IOM, UNICEF and UNDP have been the key actors facilitating the adaptation of the regional SPRR agenda. The agencies actively participated in the UN Interagency Working Group on DDR and ensured that the screening and DDR processes would be taking place according to the RSS.
17. Furthermore, the increasing collaboration among UN agencies and local actors helped for the development of policy guidelines[[29]](#footnote-30) and a common procedure for the whole process of monitoring, screening and reintegration of ex-associates and victims of Boko Haram in the Far-North region[[30]](#footnote-31). Despite the delays of the implementation of these DDR guidelines at a regional level, it is important to underpin the major progress generated as a result of increasing synergies between international organizations, UN agencies and local actors’ initiatives[[31]](#footnote-32).
18. The lack of a structured intervention plan at the beginning of the implementation of the program slowed down the synchronisation of some of the activities between countries (1.3.2, 1.4.2, 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3)
19. Effective timing and coordination were two central elements during the development of the RSS and its implementation across the region of Lake Chad Basin. However, the establishment of country specific partnerships, the synergy between UNDP and local actors and the main officers’ readiness had a major impact on the delivery time for some of the activities and the results attained in some of the countries. For instance, the development of Phase I activities and the upgrading of local police and sanitarian facilities in Chad took more time than expected and exceeded the time frame allocated for them. As discussed with some UNDP officers, the need of preparation before entertaining any activities is in many cases country specific and stakeholders’ dependant. As a result, while most of the Phase I interventions took place during 2018 some regions demonstrated significative delays and had to deploy their efforts the year after, leading to an overlapping of Phase I and II activities[[32]](#footnote-33).
20. While most of the sensitization and diagnostic activities could take place even with a rescheduled timing, administrative limitations and delays in the use of funds forced the Chad office to renounce to a certain number of resources that they had not been able to invest before the end of the Phase I. This did not mean a lack of necessity nor projects to invest the funds but quite the opposite. The late enrolment of human resources working on the project made it difficult to reach the same results that other countries were experiencing, and this could have had a major impact on the implementation of Phase II and how the RSS would be integrated in the process. Nevertheless, UNDP offices were able to achieve notable progress on the integration of local actors to the RSS, the identification of main stabilization needs and through the promotion of dialogue and reintegration of ex-associates and victims of BH among the local communities[[33]](#footnote-34).
21. Through the implementation of training and consultation activities, the project has been able to accompany the evolution of the political and legal processes for stabilization and reintegration process. (1.3.1, 1.3.2)
22. Collaboration with local stakeholders was facilitated by different dialogue and consultative activities organized in the eight regions concerned by the project. While the tenure of these activities varied from one country to the other, the result of these training and consultative activities showed the responsive aspect of the intervention. This has also enhanced the capacity of UNDP and other stakeholders to adapt and accompany political, legal, economic and institutional changes within the region (See table 6.2 for consultative and awareness activities). In some cases, where some policy changes and legal framework were needed, UN agencies, local and international stakeholders participated in the process of modernization and adaptation of the political and legal frameworks to the RSS.
23. In Niger, while analyzing the evolution and capacity of the legal framework to respond to the RSS and the SPRR process, activities like the AU and LCBC Ndjamena conference (10 to 13 April 2018) was an important platform for the study of the current practices with national authorities and forces. This allowed the reconsideration of some current practices and the need to reform them in order to ensure the sustainability of the stabilization and reintegration process[[34]](#footnote-35). As described in the *Stock-take* report for Niger, the role played by UNDP and other UN agencies throughout this legal process has been to accompany, give counsel and assist on the implementation of different administrative and project management training activities for local authorities and stakeholders[[35]](#footnote-36). Training activities organized in close collaboration with the governmental secretaries and ministries also led to the development of community action plans or local development projects[[36]](#footnote-37).
24. Similar activities took place in Nigeria, with programming activities led by different UN agencies (UNDP, OIM, UNODC, UNICEF) on migration and internal-displacements issues, law-enforcement, and child protection and development, with the AU support has been facilitating the implementation of the RSS. The main objective of this consultative dialogue between UN agencies, the AU, the LCBC and local stakeholders has been to harmonize the response given by the enforcement authorities which had the tendency to vary among the different affected regions of the country[[37]](#footnote-38).
25. The organization of both Governors’ Forums have proved to be a major platform to review practices and emphasize the process of learning from prior and current (positive and negative) experiences. This has allowed the implementation of major changes within the legislation in Niger, and has been showing an increasing number of fighters surrendering their weapons in order to reintegrate their communities[[38]](#footnote-39).
26. In Cameroon, the participation of UNDP has been even more significant and participatory. In the early stages of the project implementation, the UNDP office has been actively sharing information on trends and developments in host and return communities. This close collaboration with local authorities allowed local stakeholders to adapt their strategies in relation to the arrest and prosecution of BH ex-associates[[39]](#footnote-40). Moreover, the participation of OIM to the dialogue between actors encouraged local authorities to develop an adequate national strategy and to evolve towards the appropriation of the regional SPRR agenda[[40]](#footnote-41). While most of the activities undertaken have been focusing on dialogue and training, their final results showed improvement on the screening and profiling process, broader support for the reintegration and reconciliation process in affected communities[[41]](#footnote-42) and the implementation of a modicum of transitional justice in the process of the reintegration of former fighters[[42]](#footnote-43).
27. The integrated response to the RSS and community-based activities helped to enhance the role of women throughout the stabilization process. (1.3.3, 1.4.1)
28. Along with the 5th SDG, the ninth pillar of the RSS[[43]](#footnote-44) considers that gender equality and women empowerment should be integrated and mainstreamed throughout all the stabilization efforts and project interventions[[44]](#footnote-45). The fate of women is crucial to ensure the sustainability and implementation of the RSS. In many regions of the LCB women and kids represent most of the returnees seeking reintegration within local communities or refugees’ camps[[45]](#footnote-46). Moreover, women are considered a key element in order to demobilize men and encourage more individuals towards their reintegration to their local communities and enhance peace and stabilization in the region[[46]](#footnote-47).
29. As illustrated with table 6.1 cash for work activities[[47]](#footnote-48) in Cameroon and Chad have been showing amazing results towards the contribution of the RSS to gender equality and women empowerment[[48]](#footnote-49). However, their participation has not been consistent in all the activities of this program, neither their contribution to every level of implementation of the RSS.
30. Although women are being seen as one of the leading community voices in the reintegration and reconciliation process[[49]](#footnote-50), their role within the public administration instances it is not that relevant and some of the UNDP training activities helped to recon this problem[[50]](#footnote-51). These capacity-building activities were focused on the training of local authorities and stakeholders on governance and project planning, but the reduced number of women among these stakeholders has limited the gender equality contribution and the empowerment of women. For instance, in Cameroon out of 120 actors, only 16 women participated to the creation of Action Plans aimed at improving the participation of local populations and the consultation of actors in the decentralization of governmental decisions process (See table 6.1). This can be explained by the facilitated access from which men benefit in the case of governmental administration and institutions[[51]](#footnote-52).
31. During Phase II, activities held in Chad focusing on the reinforcement of the administrative powers and the improvement of community leader’s planning and implementation capacity have shown similar results: a limited participation of women. For two of the activities organized by the UNDP, the participating ratio of women was of 3 for 75 and 16 for 71[[52]](#footnote-53).

Table ‎6.1: Participation of women in activities undertaken by the project

| **Activity** | **Country** | **Year/ Phase** | **Number of people reached by the activity** | **Women** | **Stabilization community plans or other(s) developed locally** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| CFW-Phase II | Cameroon | Phase II | 200 bénéficiaires directs et 1000 bénéficiaires indirects | 150 direct beneficiaries |  |
| Dialogues between cross-frontier population and security forces | Cameroon | 2019-2020 | 1,060 people | 45 women and girls |  |
| Community dialogues on peacebuilding | Cameroon | 2019-2020 | 1,795 people | 773 women |  |
| Stabilization workshops | Cameroon (Kousseri and Mora) | 2018 | 104 participants | 31 women | Contribution to the preparation of 40 Action plans |
| Training on local governance and reconciliation | Cameroon | 2018 | 120 participants | 16 women | *"The participants drew up Action Plans to improve the participation of the populations in (the) diffusion of information and consultation and the continuity of the training on decentralization, project management, inter-communality, decentralized cooperation and local taxation."* |
| Peace-messaging (people reached) | Cameroon | Phase I | 164 184 people |  |  |
| Community security/peace dialogues/reconciliation/local planning | Cameroon | Phase I | 1028 people | 489 |  |
| Trainings for vigilantes, community police, CJTF, or other security personnel or dialogue meetings. | Cameroon | Phase I | 100 | 50 women |  |
| Community planning exercise - for "2.4 Effective and accountable local governance is emerging in target states" | Cameroon | Phase I | 120 | 60 women |  |
| Peace-messaging and counter narrative message production | Niger | Phase I | 468 | 150 women |  |
| Community security/peace dialogues/reconciliation/local planning | Niger | Phase I | 98 | 9 |  |
| Trainings for vigilantes, community police, CJTF, or other security personnel or dialogue meetings. | NIger | Phase I | 204 | 34 |  |
| Community counter engagement - peace dialogues/reconciliation/de-radicalization meetings or trainings | NIger | Phase I | 14712 | 7893 women |  |
| Community participative planning exercise - for "2.4 Effective and accountable local governance is emerging in target states" | NIger | Phase I | 150 | 50 women |  |
| Ateliers de sensibilisation, d’information et de plaidoyer sur les stratégies de réintégration des anciens collaborateurs des groupes extrémistes | Chad | Phase I | 174 | NA |  |
| Séances de sensibilisation de masse - Dans le cadre de *« 2.3 Renforcer les mécanismes de mobilisation communautaire existants (ou en créer de nouveaux, si nécessaire), en particulier pour les mécanismes traditionnels de résolution des conflits, de réconciliation et d'accès à la justice (comités de paix communautaires) »* | Chad | Phase II | 12600 | 6000 women (approx..) |  |
| Reinforce capacity of administrative powers and actors in planning and community engagement | Chad | Phase II | 75 | 3 women |  |
| Reinforce the capacity of community leaders on planification and population engagement | CHad | Phase II | 71 | 16 women | Consultative process in order to create a development and stabilization community plan - One plan has been realized from the work of different committees and the organization of 4 focus groups in every concerned department of the region. |
| 2.2.2 Training and raising awareness in the host communities on reconciliation and reintegration | Chad | Phase II | 4238 | NN |  |
| 2.2.5 Train joint committees / groups in transferable skills and reintegration assistance. |  |  | 300 | 110 women |  |
| Train former ex-associated with extremist groups in transferable skills and support their reintegration |  |  | 240 | 79 women |  |
| CFW- Phase II |  |  | 293 | 129 women |  |
| Formal and informal local governance mechanisms strengthened |  |  | 125 | NN |  |
| Conduct a dialogue with stakeholders on peacebuilding, reconciliation and the fight against radicalization in some communities |  |  | 1550 | 580 women (approx..) |  |

**EFFECTIVENESS**

1. Despite the persistence of security issues, a vast majority of the program objectives have been attained within the proposed time frame and by integrating a wide spectrum of local actors and other main stakeholders (2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4,2.3.1).
2. Since its beginning the current program’s main purpose was to strengthen the stakeholder’s communications and help local, regional and national authorities to create and develop a Regional Stabilization Strategy that could assist all the LCB region in their fight against Boko Haram as well as the process of reintegration of ex-associates and their victims. The development of this legal and operational framework has been achieved and progressed since Phase I of this Program. Table 6.2 details every key activities and their contribution towards the achievement of the RSS.
3. The increased communication between actors from local communities, international organizations and governments (local, regional and national) authorities has ensured a timely response to each of the program activities. While some of the interventions awaited the constitution of local intervention groups (case of Chad), the implementation of these activities has been effective in their purpose of reaching the most affected population. For instance, in Cameroon, thanks to a close collaboration with teachers, journalists and local leaders[[53]](#footnote-54), the elaboration of counter-narratives and peace messages that would be spread through local radios helped to create awareness and promote peace[[54]](#footnote-55). In Nigeria UNDP partnered with the Population Media Center in order to produce and broadcast a 26-episode radio drama series that were supposed to reach an estimated 2 million people across different regions of the Country[[55]](#footnote-56). The same exercise took different shapes among the four countries, but they all had this positive effect of promoting a reconciliation and peace message that would not just support the process of entertaining dialogue among communities, but also to encourage victims and (ex-)associates to defect and return to their community.
4. Another significant achievement of the program throughout both Phases was the capacity to map and assist on the reconstruction of key facilities for the reintegration of ex-associates and victims. In Chad two training centers have been built and equipped to maintain professional activities for local and regional citizens. In Diffa, the rehabilitation of a police office also increases police presence in some of the most affected areas. These activities have been crucial to increase the feeling of security among the population, and to limit the capacity of Boko Haram associates to attack and loot farmers and small communities.
5. On the wider spectrum of the mapping activities, Phases I and II helped to identify the main issues with local authorities and the legal process designed for DDR. There was the need to review some of the countries’ approach on returnees and their rendition process in order to assure a fair trial and allow the reintegration in the community. Furthermore, the perception surveys conducted in Cameroon and Niger helped identifying the need to work on policy development for the reintegration and community-level reconciliation in cities close to the Goudoumaria refugees’ camp. The evaluation of the screening process and the legal problems highlighted in countries as Cameroon[[56]](#footnote-57) is also an example of the positive outcomes of this continuous research of neutral, independent, impartial and efficient treatment by the authorities, and it is supposed to improve results by encouraging new civilians to defect.

Table ‎6.2: Main activities and results delivered in each respective country

| **Output** | **Key activities** | | | **Cameroun** | **Chad** | **Niger** | **Nigeria** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Cross-border community security enhanced | 2.1.1 | Identification, profiling, training and deployment of community-based vigilante groups and CJTF members | | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
|  | * Identification and profiling of new and former members of vigilante groups has been taking place as a condition for new members to join the forces * Future local capacity for identification and profiling has been built thanks to the participation of local authorities in the process. * Training of vigilante groups and other committees focused mainly on prevention and early response protocols in order to discourage the use of force and minimize opportunity for human rights abuses * Development of a trust-based relationship with local forces and authorities | |  | | | |
| 2.1.2 | Deployment and capacity development of community police, particularly on SGBV and human rights | | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
|  | * Restauration of the trust-based relation between citizens and security forces was the main objective * Training of local police forces and local authorities on human rights, SGBV and the protection of civilians (164 security forces trained in Cameroon) enabled the realization of participating dialogues among the different groups; * In several regions, such as Borno and Diffa, police capacity has been reinforced by the rehabilitation of former police stations and the delivery of new equipment for surveillance; | |  | | | |
| 2.1.3 | Continuous development and improvement of basin-wide counter narratives | | Yes | No | No | No |
|  | * By undertaking a wide scope of activities, UNDP has engaged approximately 20,000 people (approximately 50% women) across the four countries[[57]](#footnote-58); * Production of packages of alternative messages to Boko Haram narratives involving community television and radio journalists, academics * Partnership and collaboration with CSOs (as Population Media Centre, Gotel FM and Peace FM in Nigeria; and Radio Dandal Kura) to produce and broadcast counternarrative messages and radio drama-series; * The preparation of counternarrative messages took place in discussion groups with a multi-stakeholder approach. Community television and radio journalists, academics, religious leaders and civil society organizations are some of the intervening actors identified in the different discussion groups in the different countries. | |  | | | |
| Community-based reconciliation and reintegration processes supported | 2.2.1 | Technical support to the development of a legal frameworks, policies and technical approach guiding reconciliation and reintegration of former Boko Haram associates | | Yes | No | Yes | No |
|  | * CSOs and UN agencies participation on the debate to a more inclusive and welcoming legal framework helped to the instauration of some changes in Cameroon. The 2018 decree[[58]](#footnote-59) and the creation of the National disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Committee[[59]](#footnote-60) are a clear example of these active changes within the region. * Reintegration within the communities was not assured without proper profiling and identification of the ex-associates and victims of BH. Their SPRR process normally included their stay on a refugee’s camp (as Goudoumaria) or the participation on training and CfW activities.[[60]](#footnote-61) * Identification and profiling activities (when available) allowed to identify cases in need of further investigation and special juridical approach from governmental authorities[[61]](#footnote-62)   Need for a holistic approach on SPRR process across the region[[62]](#footnote-63) in order to assure a equal treatment of all the victims and ex-associates returning to their communities; | |  | | | |
| 2.2.2 | Training and awareness raising in communities of origin on reconciliation and reintegration | | Yes | Yes | No | No |
|  | * Counter-narrative activities also focused on the creation of peace and reconciliation messages in all fours countries. In Cameroon, for instance, approximately 8000 people were reached by messages and tv documentaries promoting reconciliation in 5 target localities. * Organization of sporitng, cultural and socio-educational activities were held in Cameroon. These activities allowed locals and more than 500 former associates of BH to participate and interact. * Organization of sensibilization activities and inter-community dialogue presentations. In Chad, SECADEV[[63]](#footnote-64) organized sensibilization activities in order to enhance inter-community dialogue and train the different counterparts in conflict resolution. 3 departments were reached (122 people – 31 women) and formed on the importance of dialogue as the unique solution to long-standing disputes and conflicts. * Trainings on positive and negative consequences to peaceful cohabitation and social cohesion with returnees and former associates of BH. Sharing experiences and testimonies[[64]](#footnote-65) helped to understand and raise awareness among local actors and the importance of welcoming the reintegration of former ex associates of BH. * In Chad, door-to-door campaigns were organized in order to reach community centers in three different communities (Bol, Baga-Sola, Liwa). These sensibilization campaigns allowed the CELIAF to reach more than 22000 people (with more than 12000 women among them)[[65]](#footnote-66). | |  | | | |
| 2.2.3 | Pilots for community-level reconciliation processes | | Yes | Yes | No | No |
|  | * In the Far North region of Cameroon, over 5000 former associates and community members have benefited from pilot reconciliation processes, informed by the results of perception studies carried out in the first half of 2019[[66]](#footnote-67). * In Cameroon the local initiatives consisted in various approaches : Psychosocial support in the camps of former associates in Zamay; Social cohesion activity between young people in Banki and Amchidé; Experimentation of therapeutic dances (ALGORE) in Limani, Kolofata, Magdmé and Mora; Psychological support for 10 women's groups through the practice of Living peace; Experimentation of three endogenous practices in Krawa Mafa e Zeleved; Support for the structuring of reconciliation focal points in the communities of Zamay and Mozogo; social cohesion at the border and management of conflicts over natural resources (abusive logging, fishing, land) and revitalization of cross-border peace committees in Fotokol-Gambaru and Blangoua-Mahada. * In Chad, the financing was granted to ex associates that have completed the training on local products transformation and management of a microproject. These grants allowed the ex-associates to tackle extreme poverty in their community by the realization of microprojects[[67]](#footnote-68). | |  | | | |
| 2.2.4 | Technical support to registration and profiling of CJTF members and vigilantes | | Yes | Yes | No | No |
|  | * Training and profiling activities were organized in Chad and Cameroon by UNDP. They facilitate the process of registration of vigilance committees and CJTF members, and increased awareness of abuses and misconduct in some regions. * The screening report on Vigilance committees in Cameroon allowed to identify problems in the process of returnees profiling and helped to build a national strategy. * Integration of local and regional authorities in the training process allowed to built local capacity to undertake future registrations and reinforce their commitment to ameliorate the relation between security forces and the population. | |  | | | |
| 2.2.5 | Provision of transferable skills training and reintegration support to CJTF / vigilantes | | No | Yes | No | Yes |
|  | * In Nigeria, livelihoods training and a business starter grant was provided to 190 young CJTF members selected from capacity building activities carried out in Phase I[[68]](#footnote-69). * In Chad, the project trained 300 people (110) women in production techniques and processing of local products.[[69]](#footnote-70) * In Chad, 180 members of the vigilance committees were sensitised on income generation activities as means of reintegration.[[70]](#footnote-71) * In Chad, 08 vigilance committees were supported in cash transfer and support kits including coaching to facilitate their reintegration.[[71]](#footnote-72) | |  | | | |
| 2.2.6 | Provision of transferable skills training and reintegration support to former Boko Haram associates | | Yes | Yes | No | No |
|  | * Activity was realized by steps in Chad: First, 2 awareness, information and advocacy workshops on the reintegration strategies of former associated with extremist groups in Bol and Dandi were held (174 people – 11 women). Then, 02 training workshops for community relays in local communication techniques were organized. Finally, 240 ex-associates with Boko Haram (including 79 women) were trained in production and processing of local products techniques. 60 of them received cash transfer support, support kits and coaching for their reintegration.[[72]](#footnote-73) * No similar activities were reported in the other 3 countries. | |  | | | |
| 2.2.7 | Facilitate emergency employment (Cash for work) schemes in the context of the dual targeting approach | | Yes | Yes | No | No |
|  | * Cash for work activities in Chad were concentrated on two contexts : - construction and functioning of two professional training centers for women, girls and boys (50 young people from Bol and Mani, i.e. 25 per locality -15 from the host community and 10 from the returnees-, were recruited to participate in the construction of the centres in Mani and Bol; 5 women artisan trainers have been recruited by Centre officials to train 75 other women from women's organizations in the Lac Province; additional work on the centres in Bol and Mani made possible the hiring of 81 young people); - Implementing public sanitation works in the urban areas of the 08 communities selected for the project. A total of 137 people, including 75 women, were employed[[73]](#footnote-74). * In Cameroon, 200 former associates were given temporary jobs and life skills training and were able to reintegrate into their communities[[74]](#footnote-75). | |  | | | |
| 2.2.8 | Design and broadcast radio and TV outreach programmes with peacebuilding and reconciliation messaging | | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
|  | * Production of packages of alternative messages to Boko Haram narratives involving community television and radio journalists, academics * Partnership and collaboration with CSOs (as Population Media Centre, Gotel FM and Peace FM in Nigeria; and Radio Dandal Kura) to produce and broadcast counternarrative messages and radio drama-series; * The preparation of counternarrative messages took place in discussion groups with a multi-stakeholder approach. Community television and radio journalists, academics, religious leaders and civil society organizations are some of the intervening actors identified in the different discussion groups in the different countries; * In response to the emerging threat of COVID-19 in Nigeria, project resources were repurposed to produce two special town hall broadcasts and several jingles on COVID-19 risk prevention[[75]](#footnote-76). | |  | | | |
| 2.2.9 | Support peace initiatives and platforms within and between communities (sport, cultural exchanges, among others) | | Yes | Yes | No | No |
|  | * Social, cultural and sport events organised in Cameroon and Chad allowed the development of relation between ex-associates and local population. Furthermore, these activities increased the exchanges and collaboration between authorities and local leaders across national borders. * According to the Final Report on Phase II[[76]](#footnote-77), success on the realization of these activities and its results were due to previous peace messages disseminated (activity 2.1.3) and training given to local actors in order to become “community ambassadors” (activity 2.2.2). | |  | | | |
| Formal and informal local governance mechanisms strengthened | 2.3.1 | Strengthen existing community mobilisation mechanisms in particular for traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, reconciliation and access to justice (community peace communities) | | Yes | Yes | No | No |
|  | * UNDP supported communities to create or strengthen existing local peace committees (LPCs) in Chad and Cameroon. 5 in Chad and 20 in Cameroon that totalized more than 200 awareness sessions total in both countries. * Conflict resolution mechanisms were consolidated, and local authorities trained to assist the process. * Material support (12 CGL motorcycles and 3 motorized canoes) were bought in Chad in order to reinforce the capacity of local committees for conflict prevention and resolution. | |  | | | |
| 2.3.2 | Conduct stakeholder dialogue on peacebuilding, reconciliation and counter narratives to radicalisation in selected communities | | Yes | Yes | No | No |
|  | * “As part of strengthening community mobilization mechanisms, a cross-border community dialogue was organized in Mahada on the theme of customary requirements and religions as an instrument of peaceful coexistence and peacebuilding. 08 communities of Hadjer Lamis and Lac in Chad and one community of Blangoua in Cameroon were mobilized. A total of 1,550 people, including 580 women, were involved.”[[77]](#footnote-78) | |  | | | |
| 2.3.3 | Capacity development for state and local governments on community engagement and planning, and basic public services monitoring and reporting | | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
|  | * (in Chad) COGEP\_WDECIDER group trained a total of 75 administrative authorities (governors, general secretaries of the provinces, sec. gen. of the department) on the principles of “planification, goals axed results, documentation and reporting”. | |  | | | |
| 2.3.4 | Capacity development of community representatives to engage in participatory planning processes and monitoring of basic public services | | Yes | Yes | No | Yes |
|  | * (in Chad) COGEP\_WDECIDER group trained a total of 71 community leaders on the principles of “planification, goals axed results, documentation and reporting”; * “In Cameroon, advocacy activities helped to increase the number of young people and women on the lists for the municipal and legislative elections of 2020 and there has been a 20% increase in the number of young people and women on municipal councils.”[[78]](#footnote-79) | |  | | | |
| 2.3.5 | Conduct sensitisation and training for religious leaders and traditional leaders on preventing violent extremism and radicalisation across borders | | Yes | No | No | No |
|  | * “In Cameroon, 28 traditional and religious leaders (including 6 women) from the border communities of Kérawa-Pulka and Amchidé-Banki received training on the use of alternative messages to counter violent extremism and radicalization”[[79]](#footnote-80). | |  | | | |
| 2.3.6 | Support updating of community stabilisation plans | | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
|  |  | * In Niger, eight communal stabilization plans were developed. They served as indicators and roadmap for new humanitarian and local intervening actors within the region. * In Chad two committees were set up in order to monitor and organize the process of community plan development. 3 workshops were held in order to validate survey data and assist future departmental Plan validation workshops (Bol, Bagassola, Liwa and Ngouri). * In Cameroon 5 stabilization plans were improved and validated. Each one targeted a different community in the affected region. | |  | | | |
|  |  |  | Successfully, completed or achieved |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Partially completed or achieved |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  | Non completed, or failed |  |  |  |  |

1. Dialogue and training with local population, authorities and government stakeholders ensured the development of a more comprehensive approach for SPRR and strengthened the relation between the population and regional leaders. (2.1.3/2.2.2/2.3.1/2.3.2)
2. The support given by UNDP across the region was not limited to the development of a Regional Stabilization Strategy (RSS) or the consolidation of a regional legal framework that would facilitate the DDR process. Other precise training activities were carried out in order to improve the governance capacities of local authorities. In order to engage a participating approach on the SPRR process, populations and main community leaders needed to regain confidence on their representatives and in their capacity to manage resources and facilitate the implementation of the RSS[[80]](#footnote-81). For instance, capacity building activities took place in four target communities in Nigeria (Bosso, Toumour, Kablewa and Nguigmi) with a wide spectrum of governmental stakeholders (mayors, Secretary-Generals, Municipal authorities, etc.). During these interventions, the actors covered different subjects related to planning and budget monitoring, and the development of monitoring tools for the implementation of community development plans.
3. In Cameroon, the participation of government stakeholders to these activities was more significant and allowed the development of community action plans that will encourage community engagement and more transparency in the decisional process[[81]](#footnote-82). This encouragement towards a decentralized cooperation and increased participation of CSOs in the developing process was consolidated by the realization of public investments before the end of that fiscal year in 2018[[82]](#footnote-83).
4. Training and capacity building for governmental stakeholders was not limited to governance and transparency issues. The development of a legal framework that would allow the constitution of a common strategy for the SPRR has firstly been orchestrated through the organization of different workshops and conferences[[83]](#footnote-84). These activities provided technical support to local authorities, magistrates and members of the police forces on how to incorporate rehabilitation, de-radicalization and reintegration practices in their approach towards their community and the BH ex-associates. In Cameroon, the implementation of these activities resulted with the development of a profiling exercise of the vigilantes committees in Mora, Mozogo and Blangoua. The activity allowed the identification of more than 3000 individuals that after a series of training on peacebuilding, legal and intervention protocols were incorporated into the municipal police forces or the different regional early warning and early response structures[[84]](#footnote-85).
5. The engagement of community-based associations helped beyond the reintegration of the ex-associates and victims of BH violence and ensured their participation to the economic development and sustainability of the region (2.1.2, 2.1.3,2.1.4, 2.3.1, 2.3.2).
6. The importance of engaging local civil actors and authorities for the consolidation of the RSS and the construction of a favorable environment has been a central preoccupation during the implementation of the stabilization program. Indeed, their participation has been central in the process of facilitating the community-level reconciliation and reintegration. UNDP officers and local authorities feared that by prioritizing the economic recovery of returnees’ local population would felt neglected. In order to avoid these issues, during Phase II, UNDP and the intervening governmental authorities promoted a whole society approach that included a wide spectrum of civil society organizations and individual actors willing to enhance the RSS and actively participate on the process of regional and national stabilization.
7. The cooperation with the *Union des artisans du Lac* in Chad, gave the opportunity of engaging local actors in the process of dialogue and reintegration of ex-associates and victims of BH while giving them the necessary tools and knowledge to entertain future professional activities. In order to achieve this goal, the first objective was to build up two professional training centres in Bol and Mani. Following the construction of these two centers, more than 600 people benefited directly of the training activities and the equipment provided by the program. The funds invested in these centers also helped to conduct *cash for work* activities for 156 people (54 women and 10 returnees)[[85]](#footnote-86) and to provide economic resources for these individuals to enable them to facilitate their economic and social reintegration in their community. Although the number of tools provided for the centers was limited and the funds available for the activities did not allow the inclusion of all the victims and ex-associates, civil society actors leading the organizations highlighted the importance of giving the communities the necessary tools to restart economic activities and strengthen their resilience despite adversity and BH messages[[86]](#footnote-87).
8. In other regions the communities have been engaged through the mobilization of locals NGOs and the creation of community committees to treat urgent needs and facilitate the dialogue with the political authorities[[87]](#footnote-88). For instance, the construction of the Bosso departmental Police Station in Niger allowed a constant and fluent dialogue between UNDP officers, the Community Committee, the Ministry of Interior and Public Security and the General Directorate of National Police[[88]](#footnote-89).
9. Major achievements through-out the two phases of the project were mostly associated to the integration of local and regional authorities into the UNDP strategy and the capacity of local actors to increase dialogue and cooperation across borders (2.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.3.2)
10. The implementation of common stabilization strategies and policies enhancing the DDR process across borders relied mostly on the role played by civil and international actors. Without the intervention and expertise of the UNDP offices and consultants in each particular country, the development of closer collaboration between regional organizations and state-level governments would have been quite limited and have no major impact on the legal treatment of returnees and their reintegration process. The organization of roadshows and the annual Governors’ Forums enabled a whole society approach that facilitated dialogue, SPRR implementation and the involvement of local stakeholders by UNDP offices at the moment of intervening on the field.
11. The re-engagement of these communication channels between local communities and regional and national governments have been a major step into the reconstruction of citizens’ trust in their government[[89]](#footnote-90). While the main purpose of the program is the consolidation of a Regional approach for stabilization, this could not have taken place without the implementation of a bottom-up approach that fostered the number of community committees and forums across the regions. In fact, the implementation of the first Governors’ Forum in 2018 was the result of local and regional consultations with religious leaders and local civil organizations. The year after, the second Governors’ Forum changed the approach of the event and integrated more than 250 representatives from every decisional level of each region of the LCB. The increasing number of participants at the 2019 Niamey meeting meant a more diverse public and new opportunities for partnerships, which embraced the principle of “*enhancing multi-stakeholder partnerships”[[90]](#footnote-91)*.
12. All the efforts that helped to increase regional dialogue and initiatives of cooperation around regional security issues of the most affected areas led to major changes in the governmental action. The special and dedicated training on screening, profiling and prosecution given to CJTF members in Nigeria or the profiling process of the COVI forces in Cameroon were initiatives undertaken by the local actors with full support and coordination from UNDP. They allowed the government authorities to consolidate a proper and rightful protocol for the SPRR process and improve the treatment of the returnees. Once in the Phase II of the Program, these interventions continued to represent a crucial element of the RSS. The support of the local and regional authorities became more significant and the Vigilantes Committees enjoyed not only material support (light-torches, communication equipment), but also received legal and peacebuilding trainings to prevent possible abuses of civilians by the paramilitary forces. The cross-border integrated response has been significant in this regard as most of the support given to CJTF members was aiming at increasing security around the most affected regions at the border between Nigeria-Niger and to protect the commercial and human corridors around the region of Moskota and Kolofata[[91]](#footnote-92). Also, the participation of the Ministry of Decentralization of Cameroon and the different defense forces allowed UNDP and community actors to reach out more than 1000 people among the security forces and local population[[92]](#footnote-93).
13. The screening of persons associated with Boko Haram has shown a lack of formalization, systematization and standardization among regions and countries within the LCB area[[93]](#footnote-94)(2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5).
14. The process towards the formalization of the screening of ex-associates and victims of BH has been a major issue at a regional level. While some countries as Cameroon have improved in a significative way the process and as a result encouraged more people to surrender[[94]](#footnote-95), others like Nigeria and Niger organized screening and reintegration processes which generated uncertainty among the returnees and IDPs that were currently living within IOM or refugees’ camps like the one Maiduguri, Nigeria. Indeed, there is a common agreement over the fact that reintegrating former Boko Haram members will not only help towards the stabilization of the whole LCB region, but also diminish significantly the impact and outreach of the BH and other extremist groups forces[[95]](#footnote-96). Yet, it is important to understand that the complexity of the DDR process in the LCB region did not simplify the screening task for local authorities, neither helped UNDP and local authorities to reach an effective and immediate response in this regard.
15. First of all, in contrast with first and second generation of DDR programmes, the RSS in the LCB region has embraced a third-generation approach for reintegration that includes a more heuristic framework that “*is also more thorough in how it addresses factors that influence the vulnerability of individuals to (future) recruitment by armed groups*”[[96]](#footnote-97). By taking this path, the objective was to find a common baseline that would encourage synergies and information sharing while respecting the national and regional differences[[97]](#footnote-98). These helped through the process of enhancing cross-border collaboration and inter-governmental intervention[[98]](#footnote-99). Nevertheless, the implementation of the screening process and the management of the security forces have also presented major challenges to local and national authorities. Yet, one of the problems has been the categorisation of the ex-associates, victims and other returnees. While the common approach of the RSS asked for an equal treatment among countries that would respect national particularities over legal grounds, the screening process has shown different levels of effectiveness depending on the evolution of the National institutions and the participation of Military forces in the process[[99]](#footnote-100).
16. Apart from the wide spectrum of actors intervening and implementing the screening process in each respective country -local police forces, military officials, CJTF-[[100]](#footnote-101), in many instances the differentiation between associates and people that had lived under Boko Haram rule was not clear cut. Furthermore, the lack of clarity on this process in countries such as Nigeria or Cameroon, has limited the impact of the SPRR committees and the development of a common policy for reintegration across the LCB region. It has been notified that treatment given by the security forces has not been consistent neither regular. While some women or returnees from BH in Nigeria considered that defection could lead to an unfair judgement by the Nigerian Joint Investigations Committee[[101]](#footnote-102), other IDPs and foreign ex-associates in camps in Cameroon feared the possibility of death penalty[[102]](#footnote-103).
17. It is indeed a fact that international intervention and political pressures had a major impact in the process of changing the existing legal framework and adapting it to a more favorable approach for ex-associates and victims[[103]](#footnote-104). However, the impact of these legal changes is limited when local stakeholders involved in the SPRR process are not properly guided towards a clear, systematic and formal screening process that would ensure transparency and fair treatment of both victims and ex-associates of BH[[104]](#footnote-105). In the case of Niger, the consolidation of a Development Pilot Committee has been a step forward in the development of a neutral and systematic treatment of every individual reintegration process. This ensured not only the participation of all the national governmental authorities involved in the reintegration process, but at the same time allowed a constant and methodological review of the process entertained for each actor, and recurrent meetings to discuss adequacy[[105]](#footnote-106).

**EFFICIENCY**

1. Context and country-based specificities made partners and participating stakeholders vary from one region to another. Collaboration with local and national authorities has been depicted as a fastest and more stable implementation facility than working with INGOs. (3.1.1, 3.2.1)
2. The achievements of Phase I facilitated the integration of different government actors during Phase II and increased the number of actors participating in the implementation of the different projects. Nevertheless, the nature of the authorities’ participation, their implementation capacity and their involvement varied from one region to another. For instance, the realization of different projects in Cameroon counted with the support of a wide variety of Ministries (Agriculture, Public Works, Energy) and sector-specific desks (*Commission Nationale de la Jeunesse du Cameroun*). In Chad, the close collaboration with local associations (e.g. *Union des artisans*), and the participation of the Government were main factors in order to ensure a quick and sustainable response to the local needs for reintegration of ex-associates and victims of BH.
3. Even if the participation of the local authorities varied from one region to another, and from one specific sector to another, their involvement with the program reduced the time required for the realization of the projects. At times, they also provided security support for the implementation actors. In Niger, the cooperation with the Niger Army Engineers allowed the consolidation of the RSS intervention in zones were security issues limited the deployment of other local actors or INGOs[[106]](#footnote-107). Since the Niger Army Engineers are naturally armed, they were able to be deployed in dangerous regions and ensure the security and realization of many of the facilities built up by the program[[107]](#footnote-108).
4. While some officials stated that the preference for local authorities’ agency over INGOs was primarily due to their presence on the field and their intervening capacity[[108]](#footnote-109), perception studies[[109]](#footnote-110) and research on returnees’ reasons for quitting BH showed that local authorities needed to step up and regain trust of their population to allow the stabilization of the region. Furthermore, cooperating with local authorities and community actors in the process of planning, monitoring, and restoring basic public services for the affected areas was also proven to be effective. The level of empowerment achieved through these activities and the different trainings on governance and administrative capacity and management that were given in Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad[[110]](#footnote-111), helped the implementation process and will assure a certain level of sustainability for the achieved goals.
5. There was a need to better integrate existing security and counterinsurgency strategies to the development of the RSS and the whole SPRR process (3.1.5, 3.2.1)
6. The lack of a systematic and organized procedure against BH and other terrorists’ groups in regions such as Borno have demonstrated that in certain areas, the abuse of power and destruction of civilian resources are recurrent problems. While these interventions were sometimes operated by the Military Forces of the countries covered by the Strategy, the increasing number of Vigilantes Committees members had also some negative effects as some of them took advantage of vulnerable people in remote regions.
7. Abuses normally has been characterized by rape, sexual violence, disrespect for police custody and lack (or slow) access to justice[[111]](#footnote-112). In some cases, the violation of the communities’ rights is the result of military interventions against Boko Haram elements. The testimonies of several Nigerian citizens illustrate the atrocious treatment inflicted by the Nigerian army during their intervention in Bama in 2019[[112]](#footnote-113). The lack of distinction of the Nigerian forces between the BH associates and their victims when recovering occupied villages brought unnecessary suffering to undefended people that were already suffering the consequences of captivity under the forces of BH. These violations committed by the Nigerian army did not prevail only against the population but also resulted in the destruction of a whole village[[113]](#footnote-114). By doing so, not only did the security forces diminished the almost inexistent trust between the population and the governmental authorities, but also destroyed resources and tools that could allow local communities to develop[[114]](#footnote-115) and resist radicalization[[115]](#footnote-116).
8. While UNDP has been ensuring a constant dialogue among government stakeholders and some representatives of the civil society, the results of these activities have not been good enough to ensure trust with law-enforcement agencies. This medium and long-term intervention strategy requires awareness that law enforcement has been complicit with the lack of professional conduct of the law enforcement agents and other vigilante groups[[116]](#footnote-117)[[117]](#footnote-118). Even the process of training and instruction on legal framework and peace building engaged by UNDP in Cameroon with the police officers and vigilantes’ committees risked to have limited results if the links between these security actors and the population were not reinforced. Indeed, the integration and recruitment of some of the vigilantes into the municipal police forces ensured an increasing presence of these forces where it is most needed. Nevertheless, in order to assure the respect of everyone’s interests and rights, the authorities need to support the implementation of a regional legal framework and be in a position to have the necessary resources to enhance its enforcement.
9. Among the changes that could be operated within the security forces and the legal spectrum in the region, it would be necessary to review the role played by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the process of fighting the jihadists groups in the region and assist the local communities through their recovery process. At the very beginning of its creation in 2014 the MNJTF’s main purpose was to increase cooperation and dialogue among the military and security forces of the four countries included in the program as well as Benin. However, the lack of a shared common view of the problem and a disagreement on whether BH is considered a regional problem or a Nigerian internal security issue, has led to a diminishing cooperation between authorities and an increasing complexification of the radicalization problem in the region[[118]](#footnote-119). As a result, bilateral cooperation has been reigning over integrated regional response, leaving all the interventions with a limited number of resources and a short-sighted impact[[119]](#footnote-120). Reconsidering the utility of the MNJTF and building on its regional structure would allow a common approach and force in the process of establishing authority in the occupied areas in order to reintegrate and enhance stabilization in the LCB region.
10. The leading role played by the UNDP and its regional headquarters in each country of the LCB region ensured that funding and funds flows were consistent and on time for the development of each intervention. (Q.3.1.3)
11. Several officers and local stakeholders interviewed mentioned the leading role of UNDP in managing the implementation of the different projects and ensuring the allocation of funds needed[[120]](#footnote-121). A fluid communication with the regional UNDP offices and the establishment of a calendar of funds disbursements made the implementation of some of the main activities possible. However, in times where UNDP teams were operating in highly dynamic environments, delays with the disbursement of donor’s funds became a real challenge[[121]](#footnote-122). The lack of flexibility over the availability of funds and capacity to *carry over* some amounts from one year to another seemed to be the main liability through the funding allocation process during Phase I and II of the Stabilization Program[[122]](#footnote-123). Although the conditions associated to budget allocation allowed for the reallocation of unused funds to other countries in the project, it demonstrated a lack of resources for activities that could not be engaged quickly during a given financial year[[123]](#footnote-124).
12. Nevertheless, it is important to mention that UNDP officers and implementing partners have played a leading role on increasing political and strategic efforts towards stabilization [[124]](#footnote-125) and by these means ensuring an efficient use for the funds disbursed. The UNDP presence on the ground ensured the proper disbursement of funds as well as optimizing their impact over local communities and most affected populations [[125]](#footnote-126). During the study of the regional infrastructure needs, a majority of stakeholders agreed that the funds were not sufficient to undertake all the projects that would respond to the basic needs of the affected population. Despite these limitations, UNDP national offices’ expertise in association with the increasing engagement of CSOs and government stakeholders were key factors for the implementation of community-based projects such as the restauration of police stations in Cameroon or the construction of new community and professional centers in Chad.
13. In many instances, the collaboration and active participation of CSOs within the process of reintegration ensured results beyond the program’s expectations. As mentioned by different stakeholders, local and regional empowerment it is one of the major positive results of the increasing role played by local actors and government authorities. For instance, the construction of the two training centers in Chad, one in Bol and the other in Mani, facilitated the economic reintegration of ex-associates and victims of BH. The *Union des artisans du Basin Lac Tchad* partnered with UNDP to ensure training, and *cash-for-work* activities during the Phase II of the Program[[126]](#footnote-127). Local CSOs agency have played a key role in this particular case as it allowed the empowerment of the *Union des Artisans* and demonstrated their capacity to support local populations in their economic development. After the construction of the training centers and the delivery of the sewing machines, more than 350 people had benefited from the trainings. With the revenues coming from the Union activities[[127]](#footnote-128) more machines have been bought for other locations, and the ones that were eventually broken were replaced[[128]](#footnote-129).
14. Despite limitation on available economical resources during Phase I and II, enhancing partnership among local stakeholders in Phase I allowed a significative progression on the RSS implementation and the SPRR process. (Q. 3.1.1., 3.1.4)
15. The progress achieved during Phase I has been central to the implementation of the RSS and the efficient allocation of economic resources within the LCB region. Indeed, the increasing role played by local stakeholders and governmental authorities improved the operational capacity of UNDP teams and facilitated not only a whole society approach towards stabilization[[129]](#footnote-130) but also enabled the reintegration of ax-associates and victims of BH. Through their active participation, local stakeholders and government authorities invested a lot of time and energies in ensuring that activities were carried out in complete safety [[130]](#footnote-131). This involvement of local and regional government administrations also improved the relation between the population and the elected authorities. As a result of these investments and local governance activities organized by UNDP [[131]](#footnote-132), the promotion of civilian control on public actions and the practice of participatory planning and budgeting have encouraged local initiatives and increased the impact of local authorities’ contributions [[132]](#footnote-133). For instance, in Niger the capacity building activities organized by UNDP generated four Community Development Plans (for Bosso, Toumour, Kablewa and Nguigmi) with close cooperation with local community leaders and the Department of Decentralization and Community Development [[133]](#footnote-134).
16. Thanks to the increasing number of stakeholders and local partners participating in the achievement of the RSS, the program was proven to be efficient in many ways, notably by increasing the impact of every activity despite the limited resources. Moreover, in Chad and Cameroon the implementation of the cash-for-work activities during Phase II is one of the most significant interventions to ensure the population self-subsistence of local population, by providing economic resources to former victims [[134]](#footnote-135) and by accelerating the process of construction and public infrastructure development in some of the regions [[135]](#footnote-136).
17. On the community level, it is not only ex-associates and victims that participated in cash-for-work activities: the whole population of the host communities gained access to opportunities of engaging themselves in the process of reconstructing their community. This whole community involvement allowed the combination of multiple activities and increased the results obtained with a scarce number of resources. In some countries such as Chad, *cash-for-work* activities gave priority to those who had already participated to the training sessions organized in one of the two community centers built during Phase I[[136]](#footnote-137). The purpose of this type of operations was to increase the results from their investment and reinforce their resilience by giving them the proper tools to ensure their own economic survival[[137]](#footnote-138). Simultaneously, the idea of engaging ex-associates and victims through the training process and other local and CSOs activities enhanced socialisation with the rest of the population and facilitated local dialogue[[138]](#footnote-139).

**SUSTAINABILITY**

1. Early integration of local actors and continuous development of training activities enhanced ownership by local stakeholders and government authorities. (4.1.1; 4.2.2; 4.2.3; 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.4.4)
2. From the beginning of Phase I, the Regional Stabilization Program encouraged the development of an integrated and participative approach. This resulted with the organization of multiple focus forums, capacity and professional trainings, as well as the validation by the community of stabilization and reintegration plans. While the UNDP has been leading the organization and the implementation of these activities, local governments, traditional leaders, decentralized technical services of the different States and some CSOs members played a major role in the achievement of these activities[[139]](#footnote-140). The number of participants and people affected by the activities offered by the variety of projects varies between countries, yet according to a 2019 Cameroon’s activity report, more than 5000 people participated in at least one of the activities[[140]](#footnote-141).
3. The synergy that prevailed between the different kind and different level of actors through the variety of interventions is one of the most important results when analyzing the sustainability of the Integrated Regional Stabilization of the LCB project efforts. By strengthening local governance and the role played by community groups, the project has enabled and enhanced dialogue and social cohesion among ex-associates, victims and the local population. The consolidation of this sense of community belonging and the promotion of a peace and reconciliation message led to 170 women accepting the unconditional return of female former associates into their community[[141]](#footnote-142). The perception study completed in Diffa showed that despite the initial perception that local communities would not be receptive to the progressive reintegration of ex-associates and victims of Boko Haram, a majority of the respondents seemed ready to excuse and welcome them in their community (between 76% and 72% depending on if they are or no from their community)[[142]](#footnote-143).

Figure .: More than 75% of local populations support the forgiveness of repentants from their community

Figure .: Close to two thirds of the local populations would be ready to accept the reinstallation of repentants in their own village in the context of the peace process

1. Although there has been a constant need of economic resources to increase the participation to the construction and rehabilitation of local infrastructures projects, all the activities targeting the inclusion of community actors, government authorities, traditional leaders and the different trainings on governance mechanisms enhanced resilience among the targeted communities and will provide the basis for the remaining projects results. The process of ownership of the different UNDP initiatives has been strongly established at different levels in relation with the increasing participation of the different actors and authorities in the activities. For instance, one can mention the continuity of the collaboration[[143]](#footnote-144) among different regional radios in all four countries with personalities and teachers that have been creating and transmitting counter-narrative messages since the beginning of the Program in 2018[[144]](#footnote-145).
2. Likewise, the participation of government authorities in the process of reviewing the legal framework for the DDR process in Cameroon and Chad led the regional authorities to implement a training program for members of the Vigilance Committees organized at first by UNDP and IOM officers. By doing so, municipal authorities were able to master these Vigilantes groups and give them a more accurate operating framework. Additionally, in some cases, some of the members of these groups were invited to join a local police force corps[[145]](#footnote-146). However, various sources acknowledge that some members of the Vigilance Committees are at times abusing of their role and power towards the local communities [[146]](#footnote-147). It is then necessary to keep a permanent structure and to improve the profiling exercise for the members of these civilian groups in order to assure sustainability towards the accomplishment of the RSS [[147]](#footnote-148).
3. The consolidation of complementary humanitarian programs will allow the continuity of many of the current stabilization projects and sustain the most economically most communities. (4.1.2; 4.2.1; 4.3.2; 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.4.1; 4.4.2)
4. The consolidation of a RSS and the increasing dialogue among different stakeholders from the four countries targeted by the program should be considered as the corner stone of long term regional stabilization and development in the regions of LCB. During Phase I and Phase II, all of the efforts and resources have been invested to maximize the reintegration of ex-associates and victims of BH, as well as to enhance the resilience among those communities that are continuously targeted by the different extremist groups. Despite a lack of consistency among different kinds of interventions, a vast majority of the program activities were designed to work on gender equality and facilitate the reintegration of women into their host community.
5. The integration of the RSS activities within local CSOs and UN agencies agenda, permitted and reinforced the appropriation of the recovery process in the region. Making local actors accountable of their intervention and the administration of resources, set up the basis for future programing and new international contributions in support of the stabilization of the LCB. Thus, the creation of the *Facility* and the different *National Windows* for the stabilization of the LCB region has been the continuity and exit strategy of these two Phases. Since the idea of a Phase III of the current Program was abandoned, the local stakeholders and actors interviewed recognized that the Facility is now ensuring the transition and necessary funding for the sustainability of the prior regional achievements and the realization of further accomplishments within the RSS and ODGs guidelines.
6. Training activities and other non-material interventions were designed to assure the sustainability of the projects and enhance local stakeholders’ participation and appropriation of the stabilization strategy. (4.1.1; 4.2.1; 4.2.2; 4.3.2; 4.3.3; 4.3.4)
7. It has been mentioned before that many of the UNDP interventions and local development interventions were designed to engage the most affected population and to facilitate the reintegration and future economic stability of these actors[[148]](#footnote-149). *Cash-for-work* activities provided people who were rejoining the different communities a first income to guarantee their installation and a professional training to allow them to focus on a precise occupation and economic activity henceforth. Thus, the key for the sustainability of the UNDP intervention in the region of LCB resides in the lasting effect of the Cash-for-work programs, the reactivation of the local economic activity and the capacity to enhance the participation of former associates and victims of BH.
8. The main example to illustrate this impact is the evolution of the sewing workshops that have been organized and assisted by the Union des artisans du Basin du Lac Tchad. Their impact on the appropriation of the activities once the workshops are finished and the capability of reinvesting resources into new machinery and material had a major impact on the dynamization of the local economy surrounding the first two training centers in Chad. Moreover, the different participants that partook part in these workshops and then continued working with the *Union des artisans du Basin du Lac Tchad* invested a part of their resources to assist the local authorities and communities in the fabrication of protection masks as a means to increase protection against the COVID 19 pandemic[[149]](#footnote-150).
9. Other *Cash-for-work* initiatives had a major impact within the communities and allowed similar immediate and future results within these communities. The realization of welding workshops and the rehabilitation of destroyed security buildings, were other initiatives that not only assisted the local population with immediate economic resources, but also gave them tools and knowledge for future entrepreneurship. Yet, for some of these activities, CSOs specified that a lack of machinery and tools could endanger the sustainability and reproduction of these initiatives once the Program funds won’t be available.
10. Along with the material efforts that are still contributing to the stabilization of the LCB region and the reintegration of ex-associates and victims of BH, the organization of workshops and focus-groups for the development of counter narrative messages were a part for the spreading of a peaceful and welcoming message from the different communities to possible repenti(e)s. These workshops took place in all the targeted countries and encouraged the dialogue between different religious communities and actors within the local population. In this project, teachers, experts, artists and leading figures, NGOs and UN actors, and media groups joined forces to identify the best channel to share a message that will enhance peace consolidation and reconciliation within the region. This whole process resulted in continuous messages, special programs and listening clubs that enabled the transmission of a peaceful and unifying message that reached more than 8000 people during Phase I of the Project [[150]](#footnote-151).
11. The extension of the partnership and participation of local stakeholders in the initiative allowed to extend the reach of the project. Meanwhile, the messages were reviewed to adapt to the different languages of the large variety of communities within the territory of the four countries targeted by the initiative [[151]](#footnote-152). The expansion of the geographical spread of the message also has a significative impact and resulted in countless calls to the radios to get more information on the subjects or participate more actively on the initiatives. According to six community radios in Cameroon, during Phase II more than 300.000 listeners have been reached by this project
12. Results from these continuous broadcasts on reconciliation and reintegration messages were significant and increased the number of *repentis.* Without any doubt its impact has already shown results and increased the acceptance of ex-associates by local communities. Similarly, the relay of messages and transmission of other preventive communication by the regional radios persisted beyond the scope of the project and showed the capacity to adapt to new realities such as the confection of COVID-19 prevention measures.
13. Nevertheless, several challenges are yet to be overcome by the participating stakeholders and other community actors intervening on the transmission of these messages. For instance, there is a lack of participation of local authorities and governmental actors in these activities. According to an independent study, the perception of the government’s role in these communication campaigns is too low, or simply inexistent depending on the regions[[152]](#footnote-153). By playing a more active role in these activities, authorities could restore trust with the local communities and encourage desertion among the extremists forces such as BH.

# Conclusions

**The UNDP played a major role leading the national operations of the RSS and preparing the implementation of the strategy across the LCB region.** Exchanges between the different UNDP offices and the intervening actors in each country allowed a global perspective while designing the RSS implementation. The organization of activities such as the Governors’ forums allowed the integration of different stakeholders to the initiative and facilitated the final realization of every intervention. Indeed, it is the regional approach of the program that allowed UNDP offices to integrate other UN agencies in the RSS and increase synergies with other national initiatives related to the stabilization of the LCB. Furthermore, the centralized authority of UNDP offices and their role in the operationalization of the interventions with local stakeholders ensured that funding and funds flows were consistent and respected the specific timing for each intervention.

*This conclusion relies on findings numbered 1, 3, 4 and 15.*

**The increased dialogue among countries of the LCB and the collaboration of local and regional stakeholders facilitated the development and implementation of the RSS.** Encouraged by the UNDP and the AU, local stakeholders, CSOs and all four countries governmental authorities joined their efforts for the implementation and consolidation of the RSS. This increased dialogue and exchange between parties facilitated the implementation of the RSS across borders. By integrating local actors to the regional response, not only was the sustainability of the interventions ensured, but the number of cross borders activities was increased. This allowed the development of regional procedures and standards while dealing with victims and ex-associates of BH seeking the possibility of reintegrating their community. In addition, by integrating a great number of local actors and government authorities, a vast majority of the program objectives were reached. In some cases, collaboration with governmental ministries or administrations facilitated interventions in areas with high security concerns prevailing.

*This conclusion relies on findings numbered 3, 8 and 11.*

**As a result of the increased dialogue and exchanges between governors and other regional authorities, some of the countries adapted their policies and legal frameworks to better integrate the RSS and facilitate the reintegration of victims and ex-associates of BH.** Although legal frameworks and terrorism policies are far to be harmonized between the different countries in the region, the consultative work done by CSOs, UN agencies and other local authorities facilitated the implementation of a more comprehensive legal framework. By doing so, regional authorities understood the importance of reintegrating victims and ex-associates within the communities to ensure economic development and social reconciliation within the most affected areas of the region. However, it is still necessary to address certain inconsistencies on the treatment and judgement of several ex-associates of BH in some of the countries. To address these remaining situations, harmonized detailed procedures for screening and profiling security forces (both governmental and civil) and returnees must be implemented across the region.

*This conclusion relies on findings numbered 6 and 12.*

**Projects’ interventions could have done more to better integrate the gender approach while dealing with decisional and administrative activities**. The analysis of the participation of women into different activities of the program in the four countries showed that their presence has been mostly limited to local discussions, professional trainings, and interventions prepared for the entire population. Numbers of women participating in peacebuilding, stabilization, governance, or administration trainings are significantly lower. Activity reports justify these disparities on the underrepresentation of women in governmental bodies. As a result, some of the community action plans and future activities organized by the local authorities may not represent and address the necessities of women and children.

*This conclusion relies on finding number 7.*

**Effectiveness for the SPRR process proved to be dependent on the legal framework and investment of local authorities on the reintegration process.** Since the beginning of Phase I of the RSS, it was necessary to incorporate local actors and authorities into the stabilization process of the LCB. As a result, a comprehensive approach of the needs required for the establishment of a reintegrating process for victims and ex-associates of BH has been achieved. Religious leaders, community leaders, and CSOs were major players in this strategy and ensured that most of the concerned population would be reached by every activity. Nonetheless, the limited progress on some country’s legal framework and the lack of a standard screening process across the region pointed out some limits of the reintegration process and future stabilization of the region. Abuses committed by security forces and vigilante committees, variable legal process for the returnees and unpredictable consequences for their reintegration are some of the examples pointed out in this report.

*This conclusion relies on findings numbered 9, 12 and 14*.

**Economic development and sustainability require investment on local actors and initiatives.** The evolving participation of local authorities and community leaders has been boosted by the work of the communities themselves and other CSOs. Perception studies indicated that reintegration could be facilitated by the process of a common social and economic growth within the community. This implies that both returnees and host community benefit from the results of the program’s intervention. By constructing training centers and other infrastructure and giving the possibility to train the locals on new economic activities, the program has been consolidating the economic development and sustainability of local communities. Furthermore, the complementarity of the RSS interventions with existing programs and the *new Facility* has contributed to the comprehensive approach that economically sustains most of the communities and improves the condition of the returnees. Since the implementation of the RSS, several local initiatives and micro-investments have been funded by ex-associates and other local actors from the community, enhancing their reintegration and diminishing the possibility of new individuals joining BH.

*This conclusion relies on findings numbered 10 and 18.*

**The increased participation of local actors and regional authorities since the beginning of the program improved ownership and sustainability of the interventions.** Although the program facilitated the improvement of the condition of several infrastructures within the LCB region, the major impact to be measured is the participation of the population in the process of reconstructing and consolidating peace and stability in the region. Since the beginning of Phase I in 2018, Government authorities and civil society actors have been equally consulted and engaged in the process of implementation of the RSS. Focus groups, forums, different training sessions, cash for work programs and consultative activities allowed different stakeholders to participate and consolidate their contribution into the stabilization process. It is important to underline that training on administration, governance, and economical activities, has been a central part in the constitution of a sustainable intervention in the region. With the reproduction and transmission of that knowledge, local authorities and community actors will be allowed to continue the process initiated with the contribution of the German Federal Foreign Office.

*This conclusion relies on findings numbered 17,18 and 19.*

# Recommendations

Due to the evolution of Phase II of the Stabilization program and the operational results of the Second Governors’ Forum held in Niamey in 2019 the evaluation agreed that no further recommendations should be given. To be more specific, during the Forum in Niamey, the UNDP, supported by the governments of Germany, Sweden, UK, Netherlands, the European Union and the African Development Bank, developed a financing facility that would continue and increase the efforts put towards the Stabilization of the LCB region.

The commitment of the German government to support this initiative put and end to the possibility of the implementation of a Third Phase of the Stabilization program, as all resources and efforts were now directed to this new regional facility and the four country specific windows that will manage funds and development initiatives[[153]](#footnote-154). This new operational process focuses on pillars 5, 6, 8 and 9 of the RSS, and is committed to mobilize an estimated budget of USD 100 millions in order to ensure transition from humanitarian assistance to long-term development and sustainable interventions.

The nature of the intervention and the operational process being changed, no recommendations from the evaluation of Phases I and II would apply to support efforts to bring stabilization to the region. If the purpose is to foresee future mechanisms distinct from the program here evaluated, a detailed study of the different findings and lessons learned listed on this report should be satisfactory.

# Lessons Learned

**Lesson No 1: Enhancing a participative approach increases activities to direct beneficiaries and facilitates project interventions sustainability.**

The RSS established a framework for a wide spectrum of actors invited to participate to the stabilization process within the LCB region. UNDP enhanced the inclusion of different local stakeholders in every activity and decisional process, which allowed an increased number of communities and population to be reached. Stakeholders’ participation in the different projects, activities and interventions ensured ownership and sustainability of the projects results. Furthermore, the increasing synergies between community actors, religious leaders, population, and government stakeholders favored inclusion in future governmental strategies and policies affecting these precise communities. In many cases, administrative authorities participating on the implementation of the activities, mobilized additional actors and increased the number of direct beneficiaries reached.

**Lesson No 2: Reinforcement of government stakeholders’ capacity and their participation in the stabilization process encouraged local actors’ engagement, project appropriation and durability of the interventions.**

To reach the stabilization goals listed in the RSS, the active engagement of government stakeholders facilitated not only the strategy implementation, but also ensured results’ sustainability over time. Since the beginning of Phase I, the Governors’ forum put the role of government stakeholders at the center of the RSS. The dialogue initiated between actors in 2018 through all the cross-border activities and forums has been confirming the political willingness and support to enhance the RSS as a regional framework towards stabilization. Furthermore, the integration of a multiple kind of actors (religious leaders, community leaders, CSOs, NGOs) in the second Governors’ forum in 2019 expressed the interest of local actors to participate in the stabilization process to increase projects’ ownership and sustainability of the interventions.

**Lesson No 3: Project implementation and protocol procedures are hard to harmonize in the whole region.**


Despite the increasing collaboration between governors and other government stakeholders from every country in the region, the harmonization of the intervention procedures could not be achieved. While some countries showed an increasing standardization of the SPRR process for victims and ex-associates of BH, others lacked a reliable procedure to deal with these populations and ensure their reintegration in the different communities. Furthermore, screening and profiling activities for Vigilante committees and civil security forces were not realized in all the countries. Hence, the stabilization efforts attained in some regions of the LCB encountered political and legal impediments and lacked uniformity across the whole region.

**Lesson No 4: Complementarity between projects and main stakeholders are crucial to the stabilization process.**

Several UNDP agents confirmed that the role played by local stakeholders, victims and ex-associates of BH during the implementation of the different project was crucial to the reintegration of the latest and the enhancement of the stabilization strategy. This confirmed the idea that by investing in people and local communities, the reintegration of former associates and victims of BH will be eased and contribute to the development of their host community. During both Phases of the project, integration activities and psycho-social support had a significative contribution to the reintegration process. Furthermore, the training interventions prepared, and the Cash-for-Work activities organized, helped both -local people and returnees- to find a common path and assist the development of their local community.

ANNEXES

1. Terms of Reference for the evaluation



Terms of Reference of the Final Evaluation of The Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Phase I   
and Phase II

September 2017- April 2020

June 2020

1. **INTRODUCTION**

UNDP with the support of the German Government developed and implemented ***the Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin project,*** in four countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) the phase I of the project started in September 2017 and ended in December 2018 with a budget of Euros **5,585,197.10** equivalent of **$ 6,568,646.43**  and the phase II started in January 2019 to end in March 2020 with a budget of **Euro 6,264,726.51.**

The purpose of this final evaluation is to assess the ***Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin project*** results achieved since 2017 and analyse the overall added value to stabilization in the Lake Chad Basin. This evaluation will be used for learning and accountability.

These terms of references outline the work to be undertaken by the consultant for an independent final evaluation of the project, including the progress of the outputs towards the outcomes of the project, institutional arrangements as well as Government stakeholders, expenditure rates, and opportunities for learning.

1. **PURPOSE, SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES**

The final project evaluation aims to assess the overall contribution of the ***Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin project*** in the stabilization of the affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin from September 2017 to April 2020.

The purpose of the evaluation is to assess the validity of ***the Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin Project*** Theory of Change in fragile affected areas in Cameroon Chad Niger and Nigeria, its relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and gender and youth partnership as well as impact and sustainability of the Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin project. The evaluation will assess the intended and unintended outputs, outcomes and (possible) impact of the Stabilization Projects on the target communities and make recommendations to enhance operational and programmatic effectiveness of similar initiatives in comparable situations

**Specific objectives of the evaluation are:**

* To assess the relevance, effectiveness efficiency and sustainability of ***the Integrated Regional Stabilization of Lake Chad Project Phase I and Phase II*** as well as understand the key factors that have contributed to achievement or non-achievement of the intended results;
* To determine the extent to which the ***Integrated Regional Stabilization of Lake Chad Project Phase I and Phase II*** contributed to forging and strengthening of partnerships among key stakeholders including Government, RSS secretariat, LCBC, donors, UN agencies and beneficiary communities;
* To assess the management arrangements and capacity in place by the Integrated Regional Stabilization of Lake Chad Project Phase I and Phase II, Government and the beneficiary communities in sustaining the results achieved;
* To draw lessons learned and best practices and make recommendations for future programming of projects of similar nature.

**Scope of the Evaluation:**

***The phase I started in September 2017 and ended in December 2018*** with Overall Objective of stabilizing the Lake Chad and establishing foundations for recovery and development. The project had three specific objectives:

***Specific Objective 1:*** *A common, regional approach to stabilization launched in the four countries of the Lake Chad Basin ng specific objectives*

***Specific Objective 2:*** *Regional Stabilization promoted through strengthening of community security, local governance and reconciliation*

***Specific Objective 3:*** *Reintegration of former fighters, CJTF members and vigilantes supported*

***The Phase II started in January 2019 and will end in April 2020*** with the same overall objective as phase I the following expected results:

***Specific Objective 1:*** *Coordination and implementation of the Regional Strategy for the Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience of the Boko Haram-affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin strengthened.*

***Specific Objective 2:*** *Community security, local governance, community-based reconciliation and reintegration in targeted border communities are strengthened, contributing to enhanced regional stability*

The evaluation findings will be disseminated to all stakeholders upon approval of the final evaluation report by UNDP and the Government of Germany. It will provide UNDP and Germany with a comprehensive assessment of the results, impact, efficiency and effectiveness, gender and youth participation of the Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin project in meeting stabilization and recovery needs of the eight conflict-affected target areas in Cameroon, Chad Niger and Nigeria. In addition, the evaluation will strengthen mutual accountability among all development partners/stakeholders.

1. **EVALUATION CRITERIA AND KEY GUIDING QUESTIONS**

The evaluation questions include, but not limited to the following. Final decision on the evaluation questions will emerge from consultations among Germany and UNDP.

**Relevance:**

* To what extent was the project in line with the regional development priorities, the Regional programme’s outputs and outcomes, the UNDP Strategic Plan and the SDGs?
* Are the objectives of the projects in line with the Federal Foreign Office’s political aims and does meeting the objectives plausibly contribute to achieving Germany’s foreign policy goals (see e.g. The Guidelines of the Federal Government of Germany on preventing crises, resolving conflicts, building peace)?
* To what extent was the project able to accompany political processes in the four countries/regionally?
* To what extent has the project been appropriately responsive to political, legal, economic, institutional, etc., changes in the region?
* To what extent do the objectives of the project correspond with the priorities and requirements of the beneficiaries? To what extent were community voices incorporated effectively into local decision-making processes and siting of interventions? How could the project have given stronger voices to the local beneficiary communities?
* To what extent does the project contribute to gender equality, the empowerment of women and the human rights-based approach?
* To what extent were the integrated Regional Stabilization Project appropriate in terms of programme conceptualization and design?
* To what extent did the project design contribute toward the overall stabilization objectives and priorities as perceived by the beneficiaries?
* To what extent did the project contribute to enhancing the capacity of government institutions and beneficiary communities?
* How is the project embedded in other activities by national and international actors? Did any coordination take place? Were there any synergies?

**Effectiveness:**

* To what extent did the project contribute to the regional programme outcomes and outputs, the SDGs, the UNDP Strategic Plan and regional development priorities?
* To what extent were the project outputs achieved?
* What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended regional stabilization project outputs and outcomes?
* To what extent has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective?
* Were there any unintended effects (positive or negative) of the project?
* In which areas does the project have the greatest achievements? Why and what have been the supporting factors? How can the project build on or expand these achievements?
* To what extent did the Integrated Regional stabilization Project achieve the intended results and were there any unintended results?
* In which areas does the project have the fewest achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can or could they be overcome?
* What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving the project’s objectives?
* Are the projects objectives and outputs clear, practical and feasible within its frame?
* To what extent have stakeholders been involved in project implementation?
* To what extent are project management and implementation participatory and is this participation contributing towards achievement of the project objectives?
* To what extent has the project been appropriately responsive to the needs of the national/regional constituents and changing partner priorities?

**Efficiency:**

* To what extent was the project management structure as outlined in the project document efficient in generating the expected results?
* To what extent have the UNDP project implementation strategy and execution been efficient and cost-effective?
* To what extent has there been an economical use of financial and human resources? Are project approaches, resources, models, conceptual framework relevant to achieve the planned outcome? Are they sufficiently sensitive to the political and development constraints of the countries in the project region (political instability, post crisis situations,)
* To what extent did the coordination of activities and engagement among the Projects stakeholders contribute to the achievement or non-achievement of the outcomes?
* Did the programme’s implementing partners have the requisite skills/capacity to deliver infrastructure and develop governments’ institutional capacity at local levels?
* How efficiently was the fund flow managed at different levels? Were levels of subsequent fund disbursements comparable to the levels of physical progress made across the project? In other words, to what extent did the fund managers apply payment by milestones arrangement with implementing partners? Was there flow of funds tracking, disbursement triggers and monitoring of physical progress?
* Did the Stabilization Projects provide value for money in terms of costs and benefits?
* To what extent were the projects complementing other interventions in target states?

**Sustainability and Continuity:**

* What is the likelihood that project interventions are sustainable?
* Are efforts being made to establish structures that will remain in place after the project/programme has been completed and which can be maintained without continued funding of the German Federal Foreign Office?
* Are there any financial risks that may jeopardize the sustainability of project outputs?
* Is there any exit plan or exit strategies for activities continuity after the project?
* To what extent will financial and economic resources be available to sustain the benefits achieved by the project?
* Are there any social or political risks that may jeopardize sustainability of project outputs and the project’s contributions to regional programme outputs and outcomes?
* Do the legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes within which the project operates pose risks that may jeopardize sustainability of project benefits?
* What is the risk that the level of stakeholders’ ownership will be sufficient to allow for the project benefits to be sustained?
* To what extent do mechanisms, procedures and policies exist to allow primary stakeholders to carry forward the results attained on gender equality, empowerment of women, human rights and human development?
* To what extent do stakeholders support the project’s long-term objectives?
* To what extent do UNDP interventions have well-designed and well-planned exit strategies?
* What could be done to strengthen exit strategies and sustainability?
* How many target beneficiary communities’ security needs have worsened since implementation of the projects?
* Has the Projects partnership strategy been appropriate, effective and contributed to sustainable impact?
* How strong is the level of ownership of the Joint Stabilization Projects outputs by the Lake Chad Basin Government and beneficiary communities?
* What is the level of stated commitment by the government and beneficiary community in sustaining the Stabilization Projects outputs/outcomes and continue working for sustaining/enhancing the impact?
* Have some lessons learnt been transferred to partners, including local governments, in order to strengthen long-term sustainability?
* What lessons learnt need to inform future stabilization and/or post conflict recovery interventions?

1. **METHODOLOGY**

The project evaluation will be carried out by an external evaluator and will engage a wide array of stakeholders and beneficiaries, including regional bodies, governments were interventions or advisory support were provided, etc.

The project evaluation is expected to take a “theory of change’’ (TOC) approach to determining causal links between the interventions that stabilization project has supported and observed progress at the regional level. The evaluator will develop a logic model of how UNDP RSCA acceleration and ratification interventions are expected to lead to improved service delivery.

Evidence obtained and used to assess the results of the support should be triangulated from a variety of sources, including verifiable data on indicator achievement, existing reports, and technical papers, stakeholder interviews, and other means as far as the current situation allows.

The evaluation is expected to adopt a mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches including document review, stakeholder interviews, site inspections, system analysis, inventory and resource records and cost / benefit analysis. The evaluators will develop a rigorous methodology for the final evaluation and the sampling strategy as part of this assignment with guidance provided by the project team. An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) if possible—consisting of UNDP and Germany—will be established and the ERG will evaluate the proposed methodologies as part of the selection process.

The evaluation process will include but not limited to the following:

* Desk reviews: The evaluation team will collect and review all relevant documentation, including the following:
* Project document (contribution agreement)
* regional programme document;
* ii) project documents and activity reports;
* Result Oriented Analysis Report
* v) support services provided to country offices; vi) country office reports; vii) UNDP’s corporate strategies and reports; and viii) government, media, academic publications.
* Theory of change and results framework.
* project quality assurance reports.
* Annual workplans.
* Activity designs.
* Consolidated quarterly and annual reports.
* Results-oriented monitoring report.
* Highlights of project board meetings.
* Technical/financial monitoring reports.
* Stakeholder interviews: The evaluator team will conduct face-to-face if applicable and/or telephone interviews with relevant stakeholders, including: i) UNDP staff (managers and programme/project officers) at the Regional Center and Country Offices; and ii) policy makers, beneficiary groups and donors, including RSS Secretariat, donors, government officials, and other United Nations Organisations.

All interviews should be undertaken in full confidence and anonymity. The final evaluation report should not assign specific comments to individuals.

A case study approach could be used to identify and highlight issues that can be further investigated across the project. Final methodological approach including interview schedule, and data to be used in the evaluation will be outlined in the inception report and discussed UNDP, Germany and the evaluator.

1. **EVALUATION PRODUCTS (DELIVERABLES) AND TIMELINES**

The main deliverables of the evaluation are:

Draft and final inception report

Draft evaluation report (within an agreed length).

Final evaluation report including lessons.

Presentations to stakeholders and/or the evaluation reference group through Zoom or Skype can be organized by project team.

Evaluation brief and other knowledge products or participation in knowledge-sharing events, if relevant.

1. **Inception report (10 – 15 pages):** The inception report should detail the evaluators understanding of the final evaluation questions and objectives; present the proposed theory of change for UNDPs work on stabilization in the region, detailed methodology including sampling strategy, data collection and analysis plan (based on the guidance given by the ERG). The inception report should also include a refined work plan with clear timelines, detailing key deliverables and a comprehensive evaluation matrix with a detailed list of key questions, sub questions relating to the evaluation criteria; data sources; methods of data collection, indicators/success standards and methods of data analysis.
2. The inception report will be submitted by the consultant one week after the signing of the contract.
3. **Evaluation debriefings. Immediately following an evaluation, UNDP may ask for a preliminary debriefing and findings**
4. **Draft evaluation report[[154]](#footnote-155) and a PowerPoint presentation:** The first draft of the report will be completed in-country. The first draft will contain summary of key findings, lessons learned, risk management and recommendations, which will be presented in N’Djamena to the Steering Committee and to other key stakeholders. Feedback from the presentation and reviews by key stakeholders will be shared with the evaluator for finalisation of the report. **(20 days).**

The programme unit and key stakeholders in the evaluation should review the draft evaluation report and provide an amalgamated set of comments to the evaluator within an agreed period of time, addressing the content required (as agreed in the TOR and inception report) and quality criteria as outlined in these guidelines.

Evaluation report audit trail. Comments and changes by the evaluator in response to the draft report should be retained by the evaluator to show how they have addressed comments.

1. **Final evaluation report including lessons:** After incorporating feedback received on the draft report, the evaluator will submit a final report as per the agreed timelines. The evaluator will attach the following annexes to the final report; data collection tools and guidelines, datasets, analysis plans, collation and aggregation tables, risk matrix, etc., if available. Guidance for the outline of the report is contained in Annex 1 below. The evaluator will make a presentation of the evaluation findings to all stakeholders including state government officials. **(10 Days)**
2. **Evaluation brief and other knowledge products or participation in knowledge-sharing events, if relevant**
3. **EVALUATION TEAM COMPOSITION AND REQUIRED COMPETENCIES**

**Skills and qualifications:**  The evaluator will be an international firm with extensive experience of conducting improvement and accountability evaluations in stabilization and post conflict recovery programmes. The evaluation provider is expected to demonstrate:

* **Excellent value for money**: including competitive consultancy rates, a detailed financial plan, a clear methodology to ensure products will be delivered in line with agreed costs, a mitigation strategy for financial risk, and clear financial reporting processes.
* **An excellent understanding of evaluation principles and methodologies:** including capacity in a range of qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods; evidence of research or implementation expertise in stabilization and post conflict recovery; and an awareness of gender, social and conflict analysis in evaluation.
* **Expertise in communications**, dissemination and advocacy around evaluation findings: including a good understanding of the use of evidence-based approaches to influence stakeholders.
* **A high-quality proposal for this assignment:** including a good understanding of these terms of reference; an evaluation methodology which meets international best practice; and a realistic and adequate workplan to deliver outputs.
* **A qualified and structured team:** including demonstrated capacity by the study leader in financial and human resource management, and in the production of timely, high-quality reports; a balance of appropriate skills and expertise within the team in evaluation methodologies, sector expertise, and social analysis; and appropriate involvement of local partners to build evaluation capacity and provide value for money.

It would be up to the firm to propose the optimum team composition and clearly specify the role of each team member required to achieve the objectives of the evaluation. However, it is suggested that the evaluation team must be composed of experts who have proven knowledge and relevant work experience in the field of conflict and community security as well as sound knowledge about results-based management (especially results-oriented monitoring and evaluation). The team needs to comprise national Consultant (Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) and international experts. Given the limited timeframe available, it is expected that (at least) two teams be deployed to cover the field work this is to be followed with the Covid-19 situation and development. Each team should have at least one national consultant of Cameroon Chad Niger and Nigeria as team member.

The independent evaluator should have:

* **At least ten years of experience in programme evaluations**, of which at least five years should be in international settings – preferably in post-conflict or fragile state contexts;
* **Experience in operating in difficult operational environment**;
* **Experience in Lake Chad Basin in Cameroon Chad Niger and Nigeria**, post-conflict areas, and/or other East African countries will be an advantage;
* **Experience in engaging with local community members**, using participatory and consultative approaches;
* **Experience in engaging with government institutions** and Donors handling sensitive information;
* **Experience in Gender, Results Base Management and Human Rights**
* **Experience in monitoring/evaluating conflict prevention, peacebuilding, stabilization** or community security-related programmes or projects will be an advantage; and
* **The evaluation team should be enough technically qualified** to monitor and implement activities and deliver all required outputs. Moreover, the evaluation teams must have:
  + Demonstrated strong oral and written communications skills in English and a good knowledge of French;
  + Good interpersonal skills and ability to work in a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic environment with sensitivity and respect for diversity;
  + Ability to work independently with minimal supervision and maintain flexibility in working hours.

1. **EVALUATION ETHICS**

The evaluation should be conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the United Nations Evaluation Group Ethical Guideline, which is available at

<http://www.uneval.org/document/detail/100>

Consultant must be free and clear of perceived conflicts of interest. To this end, interested consultants will not be considered if they were directly and substantively involved, as an employee or consultant, in the formulation of project strategies and programming relating to the outcome and programme under review. Evaluator’s methodology should ensure independence and impartiality of judgment in assessment findings and recommendations.

1. **IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS**

UNDP will recruit a consultant though a competitive process and inline with UNDP Process. UNDP will be responsible for the management of the evaluator. Senior Advisor Head of Stabilization will designate a focal point for the evaluation that will work with the Evaluation Specialist to assist in facilitating the process (e.g., providing relevant documentation, arranging visits/interviews with key informants, etc.). The Government of Germany and UNDP will approve the final report.

The UNDP focal person will arrange introductory meetings and will establish initial contacts with partners and project implementation IPs. The consultant will take responsibility for setting up meetings and conducting the evaluation, subject to advanced approval of the methodology submitted in the inception report. UNDP will develop a management response to the evaluation within four weeks of report finalization.

The selected independent evaluator is responsible for the overall evaluation activities and quality of the evaluation process as well as the products. It will be the responsibility of the evaluator to logistically and financially arrange their travel to and from relevant project sites (if the pandemic allows) and to arrange most interviews. Planned travels and associated costs will be included in the Inception Report and agreed if required. An Evaluation Reference Group (ERG) composed of Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist of UNDP CO’s in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, Germany and Capacity Building Specialist for the RSF will be contacted.

The independent evaluator reports to the ERG and the Senior Advisor Head of Stabilization RSS Secretariat. The ERG reviews the deliverables and methodologies proposed by the evaluator and advices on any improvements to ensure the validity and quality of the evaluation, if need be. Moreover, the UNDP Regional Stabilization Secretariat in N’Djamena will:

* Provide the evaluator with appropriate support (in those situations that are beyond the evaluator’s control) to ensure that the objective of the evaluation is achieved with reasonable efficiency and effectiveness;
* Focal point in UNDP Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria will support the evaluator during the evaluation process;
* Ensure that relevant documents are available to the consultants upon the commencement of their tasks;
* Coordinate and inform government counterparts, partners and other related stakeholders as needed with the support of UNDP CO’s focal points;
* Support to identify key stakeholders to be interviewed as part of the assessment;
* Help in liaising with partners; and
* Organize inception meetings between the selected evaluator, partners and stakeholders prior to the scheduled start of the evaluation assignment.

1. **TIMEFRAME FOR THE EVALUATION PROCESS**

The evaluation is expected to take 40 working days, starting 1st July 2020. The report is due the 30th of September 2020. The following table provides an indicative breakdown of activities and delivery:

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Activity** | **Deliverable** | **Workday allocation** |
| Review materials and develop work plan | Inception report and evaluation matrix  (1st July-10 July 2020) | 10 |
| Participate in an Inception Meeting with project staff and M&E of the RSCA and relevant partners |
| Draft inception report |
| Review Documents and stakeholder consultations | Draft evaluation report  Stakeholder workshop presentation  (20 July-10 August 2020) | 20 |
| Interview stakeholders |
| Conduct field visits |
| Analyse data |
| Develop draft evaluation & lesson Learned report to project |
| Present draft Evaluation and lesson learned Report at Validation Workshop | Final evaluation report  (20 September-30 September 2020) | 10 |
| Finalize and submit evaluation and lessons learned report incorporating additions and comments provided by stakeholders |
|  | Totals 40 | 7.5 weeks |

The evaluator should provide the detail list of activities and timeframe during the inception report. However, evaluation activities should be carried out and deliverables produced within 40 working days during the period mid-May to July 2020.

1. **PAYMENT MODALITY:**

The payment modality would be based on the following milestones:

* Completion of inception report (20%).
* Submission of Draft Evaluation Report and a PowerPoint presentation (60%).
* Submission of Final Evaluation Report (20%).

**ANNEX I: Application submission process and criteria for selection**

Evaluation forms for technical proposals follow on the next two pages. The obtainable number of points specified for each evaluation criterion indicates the relative significance or weight of the item in the overall evaluation process.

The Technical Proposal Evaluation Forms are:

* Form **1:** Expertise of Firm / Organisation Submitting Proposal
* Form **2:** Proposed Work Plan and Approach
* Form **3:** Personnel

Note: The score weights and points obtainable in the evaluation sheet are tentative and should be changed depending on the need or major attributes of technical proposal.

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Summary of Technical Proposal Evaluation Forms** | | **Score Weight** | **Points Obtainable** | **Company / Other Entity** | | | | |
| **A** | **B** | **C** | **D** | **E** |
| 1. | Expertise of Firm / Organisation submitting Proposal | 30% | 300 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2. | Proposed Work Plan and Approach | 50% | 500 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 3. | Personnel | 20% | 200 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | **Total** | | **1000** |  |  |  |  |  |

| **Technical Proposal Evaluation**  **Form 1** | | **Points obtainable** | **Company / Other Entity** | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **A** | **B** | **C** | **D** | **E** |
| Expertise of firm / organisation submitting proposal | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | |
| 1.1 | Reputation of Organisation and Staff (Competence / Reliability) | 40 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.2 | Litigation and Arbitration history | 15 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.3 | General Organisational Capability which is likely to affect implementation (i.e., loose consortium, holding company or one firm, size of the firm / organisation, strength of project management support e.g., project financing capacity and project management controls) | 85 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.4 | Extent to which any work would be subcontracted (subcontracting carries additional risks which may affect project implementation, but properly done it offers a chance to access specialised skills. | 15 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.5 | Quality assurance procedures, warranty | 25 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1.6 | Relevance of:  Specialized Knowledge  Experience on Similar Programme / Projects  Experience on Projects in the Region  Work for UNDP/ major multilateral/ or bilateral programmes | 160 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | 340 |  |  |  |  |  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Technical Proposal Evaluation**  **Form 2** | | **Points Obtainable** | **Company / Other Entity** | | | | |
| **A** | **B** | **C** | **D** | **E** |
| Proposed Work Plan and Approach | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | |
| 2.1 | To what degree does the Offeror understand the task? | 30 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.2 | Have the important aspects of the task been addressed in sufficient detail? | 25 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.3 | Are the different components of the project adequately weighted relative to one another? | 20 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.4 | Is the proposal based on a survey of the project environment and was this data input properly used in the preparation of the proposal? | 55 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.5 | Is the conceptual framework adopted appropriate for the task? | 65 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.6 | Is the scope of task well defined and does it correspond to the TOR? | 120 |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2.7 | Is the presentation clear and is the sequence of activities and the planning logical, realistic and promise efficient implementation to the project? | 85 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 400 |  |  |  |  |  |

| **Technical Proposal Evaluation**  **Form 3** | | | | **Points Obtainable** | **Company / Other Entity** | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **A** | **B** | **C** | **D** | **E** |
|  | | | | | | | | | |
| 3.1 | Task Manager | |  | 130 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | | Sub-Score |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | General Qualification | | 115 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Suitability for the Project | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - International Experience | 20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Training Experience | 20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Professional Experience in the area of specialisation | 45 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Knowledge of the region | 30 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Language Qualifications | | 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | 130 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
| 3.2 | Senior Expert | |  | 110 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | Sub-Score |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | General Qualification | | 95 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Suitability for the Project | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - International Experience | 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Training Experience | 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Professional Experience in the area of specialisation | 45 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Knowledge of the region | 20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Language Qualifications | | 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | 110 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
| 3.3 | Junior Expert |  |  | 20 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | Sub-Score |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | General Qualification | | 15 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Suitability for the Project | |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - International Experience | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Training Experience | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Professional Experience in the area of specialisation | 10 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Knowledge of the region | 0 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| - Language Qualification |  | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | 20 |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | | | | | | |
|  | **Total Part 3** | |  | 260 |  |  |  |  |  |

**ANNEX II: Evaluation Matrix**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Relevant evaluation criteria** | **Key questions** | **Specific sub questions** | **Data sources** | **Data collection methods/tools** | **Indicators/ success standards** | **Methods for data analysis** |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

**ANNEX III: SUGGESTED REPORT STRUCTURE**

| **Indicative Section** | **Description and Content** |
| --- | --- |
| Title and opening pages |  |
| Table of contents |  |
| List of acronyms and abbreviations |  |
| Executive summary | This should be an extremely short chapter, highlighting the evaluation mandate, approach, key findings, conclusions and recommendations. Often, readers will only look at the executive summary. It should be prepared after the main text has been reviewed and agreed and should not be circulated with draft reports. |
| Chapter 1: Introduction (Background and approach/methodology) | Introduce the rationale for the evaluation, including mandate, purpose and objectives, outline the main evaluation issues including the expected contribution at the outcome level, address evaluability and describe the methodology to be used. |
| Chapter 2: The development context and challenges of the Affected Areas of the Lake Chad Basin | In addition to providing a general overview of historical trends and development challenges, specifically address the evaluation theme. Explain how the theme is addressed by government in Cameroon Chad Niger and Nigeria, and how it is reflected in national policies and strategies and regional institutions as LCBC and African Union Commission. Also provide information on the activities of other development partners in the area. |
| Chapter 3: Integrated Regional Stabilization Projects Phase I and Phase II responses and challenges in the Lake Chad Affected Areas | Against the background of Chapter 2, explain what the Integrated Regional Stabilization Project Phase I and Phase I achieved stabilization in affected areas of the Lake Chad Basin (purely descriptive, not analytical). Provide the overarching outcome model, specifying the results frameworks for the projects, as well descriptions of some of the main Stabilization Project activities. |
| Chapter 4: Development results (Presentation of findings based on the evaluation criteria, questions and other cross-cutting issues). | Against the background of Chapters 2-3, analyze findings without repeating information already provided. Also, minimize the need to mention additional information regarding projects (these should be described in Chapter 3). Focus on providing and analyzing evidence relating to the evaluation criteria. Preferably, structure the analysis based on the main evaluation criteria: • Relevance • Effectiveness • Efficiency • partnership Sustainability. In addressing the evaluation criteria, the narrative should respond to the corresponding evaluation questions identified and agreed on during the inception stage. It should also provide a summary analysis of the findings. |
| Chapter 5: Conclusions, lessons learnt and recommendations | Conclusions are judgments based on evidence provided in Chapter 4. They are pitched at a higher level and are informed by an overall, comparative understanding of all relevant issues, options and opportunities. Do not provide new evidence or repeat evidence contained in earlier chapters. Lessons learnt and recommendations should be derived from the evidence contained in Chapter 4. They may also, but need not necessarily, relate to conclusions. |
| Annexes | TOR  Data collection tools  Questionnaires  List of interviewed Persons  Other key documents |

**ANNEX V: EVALUATION DOCUMENTS**

* Project document Integrated Regional Stabilization Phase I
* Project document Integrated Regional Stabilization Phase II
* Progress report phase I
* Progress report Phase II
* Final Report phase I
* Signed CDR
* Field visits/monitoring reports
* Other relevant documents.
* Steering committee/ Board meeting reports
* ROAR
* Financial reports (Atlas)
* IP reports
* Regional programme report

1. Matrix of Evaluation with Questions, Sub-Questions, Indicators, Sources of Information and Data Collection Methods

| Evaluation Criteria | Questions | Sub-questions | Indicators | Sources of Information | Data Collection Methods |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1. **Relevance** | **1.1 To what extent was the project in line with the regional development priorities?** | 1.1.1 Was the project in line with the Regional programme’s outputs and outcomes?  1.1.2. Was the project in line with the UNDP Strategic Plan and the SDGs?  1.1.3 How is the project embedded in other activities by national and international actors?  1.1.4 Did any coordination take place with other actors?  1.1.5 Were there any synergies between the project and other initiatives? | Level of adequacy between the programme’s outputs and outcomes and UNDP Regional strategic Plan  Level of relevance of the programme with the SDG (particularly SDG No 16  Nature and number of coordination mechanisms with other actors  Nature and number of synergies prevailing between the project and other initiatives | Project document Integrated Regional Stabilization Phases I and II  UNDP Country Strategies  UNDAF Plans  Sustainable Development Goals | Documentary review  Interviews with key UNDP, LCB officials and staff |
| **1.2 Are the objectives of the projects in line with the Federal Foreign Office’s political aims?** | 1.2.1 Does meeting the objectives of the project plausibly contribute to achieving Germany’s foreign policy goals? | Level of alignment of the project with the Federal Foreign Office political objective | Guidelines of the Federal Government of Germany on preventing crises, resolving conflicts, building peace  Opinions of German officials involved in the programme | Documentary review  Interviews with senior German officials at central and field (Capitals) levels |
| **1.3 To what extent was the project able to accompany political processes in the four countries/regionally?** | 1.3.1. To what extent has the project been appropriately responsive to political, legal, economic, institutional, etc. changes in the region?  1.3.2 To what extent did the project design contribute to enhancing the capacity of government institutions and beneficiary communities?  1.3.2 To what extent does the project contribute to gender equality, the empowerment of women and the human- rights based approach | Nature of political, legal and other institutional changes in each respective country  Perception related to the level of improvement of government institutions  Perceptions of beneficiary communities about their priorities being taken into account  Nature of gender equality and human-rights based policies and initiatives put forward by the project | Compilation of legal or institutional changes on a country basis generated by the project  Opinions of national/local political/institutional constituencies  Opinions of beneficiaries’ communities (through perception surveys (if existing), IP reports, Phase I and II reports, Stock-Taking national reports) | Phone/Skype interviews  Documentary review  Perception surveys (if existing) |
| **1.4. To what extent do the objectives of the project correspond with the priorities and requirements of the beneficiaries?** | 1.4.1. To what extent were community voices incorporated effectively into local decision-making processes and siting of interventions?  1.4.2. How could the project have given stronger voices to the local beneficiary communities? | Level of integration of community voices within decision-making processes throughout the project  Perceived strengths or weaknesses of community voices within the project | Opinions of donor, UNDP, CSO and/or national/local constituencies  Opinions of beneficiaries’ communities (through perception surveys (if existing), IP reports, Phase I and II reports, Stock-Taking national reports) | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries  Perception surveys (if existing) |
| **1.5 To what extent were the integrated Regional Stabilization project appropriate in terms of programme conceptualization and design?** | 1.5.1. To what extent did the project design contribute toward the overall stabilization objectives and priorities as perceived by the beneficiaries (institutions, local populations)? | Perception of the beneficiaries of the well-founded nature of the project to pursue stabilization objectives in their respective regions | Opinions of donor, UNDP, CSO and/or national/local constituencies  Opinions of beneficiaries’ communities (through perception surveys (if existing), IP reports, Phase I and II reports, Stock-Taking national reports) | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries  Perception surveys (if existing) |
| 1. **Effectiveness** | **2.1 To what extent does the project contribute to the regional programme outcomes and outputs, the SDGs, the UNDP Strategic Plan and regional development priorities?** | 2.1.1. Are the project objectives and outputs clear, practical and feasible within its frame?  2.1.2 To what extent did the Integrated Regional stabilization Project achieve the intended outputs and results and were there any unintended results?  2.1.3 What factors have contributed to achieving or not achieving intended regional stabilization project outputs and outcomes?  2.1.4 To what extent has the UNDP partnership strategy been appropriate and effective? | Perceptions of feasibility of the project objectives and expected outputs  Level of achievement of the project outputs (quantity/percentage) and results (outcomes?)  Nature and quality of the main factors contributing to the project outputs and outcomes  Perceptions related to the appropriateness and effectiveness of UNDP partnership strategy | Technical proposal of the Project  Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  CSO and Governors’ For reports  IP reports for each respective country  Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries  Perception surveys (if existing) |
| **2.2 What have been the greatest (weakest) achievements of the project and its main challenges?** | 2.2.1. In which areas does the project have the greatest achievements?  2.2.2 Why and what have been the supporting factors? How can the project build on or expand these achievements?  2.2.3. In which areas does the project have the fewest achievements? What have been the constraining factors and why? How can or could hey be overcome?  2.2.4 What, if any, alternative strategies would have been more effective in achieving the project’s objectives?  2.2.5 Were there any unintended effects (positive or negative) | Nature and number of the greatest and weakest achievements of the project  Nature and quality of the main supporting or constraining factors  Perceptions related to the sustainability of supporting and constraining factors  Level of stakeholder’s opinion about any possible alternative strategy that may have been followed by the project | Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  CSO and Governors’ For reports  IP reports for each respective country  Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |
| **2.3. To what extent have stakeholders been involved in project implementation?** | 2.3.1 To what extent are project management and implementation participatory and is this participation contributing towards achievement of the project objectives?  2.3.2 To what extent has the project been appropriately responsive to the needs of the national/regional constituents and changing partner priorities? | Extent to which UNDP, IP and other constituencies think that project management was participatory  Perceptions of national/regional constituents about the project’s responsiveness | Technical proposal of the Project  Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  IP reports for each respective country  Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries  Perception surveys (if existing) |
| 1. **Efficiency** | **3.1 To what extent has there been an economical use of financial and human resources?** | 3.1. Are project approaches, resources, models, conceptual framework relevant to achieve the planned outcome?  3.1.2 Are they sufficiently sensitive to the political and development constraints of the countries in the project region (political instability, post crisis situations)?  3.1.3 To what extent the project management structure as outlined in the project document efficient in generating the expected results?  3.1.4 To what extent have the UNDP project implementation strategy and execution been efficient and cost-effective?  3.1.5 Did the programme’s implementing partners have the requisite skills/capacity to deliver infrastructure and develop governments’ institutional capacity at local levels? | Extent to which UNDP and governmental officials consider the conceptual framework relevant to achieve the planned outcome  Perceptions of stakeholders related to the conflict sensitivity of the region of the project  Extent to which key stakeholders consider the project management structure efficient in generating the expected results  Extent to which project and finance managers, donor and IP officials consider the project efficient and cost-effective  Extent to which UNDP COs believe that IP had the requisite skills/capacity to deliver institutional capacity at local levels | Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies  Financial information available (UNDP, IP, Donor, audits)  HR information available  Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  IP reports for each respective country  Notes from the Steering Committee | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |
| **3.2 How well coordinated were the project interventions throughout the region?** | 3.2.1 To what extent did the coordination of activities and engagement among the Project stakeholders contribute to the achievement or non-achievement of the outcomes?  3.2.2 To what extent were the projects complementing other interventions in target states? | Perceptions related to the level of coordination among the project stakeholders  Extent to which the projects were completing other interventions in target states | Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies  Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  IP reports for each respective country  Notes from the Steering Committee | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |
| **3.3. How efficiently was the fund flow managed at different levels?** | 3.3.1 Were levels of subsequent fund disbursements comparable to the levels of physical progress made across the project?  3.3.2 To what extent did the fund management apply payment by milestones arrangement with implementing partners?  3.3.3 Was there flow of funds tracking, disbursement triggers and monitoring of physical progress?  3.3.4 Did the Stabilization projects provide value for money in terms of costs and benefits? | Extent to which funds disbursement were following physical progress across the project  Perceptions of the efficiency of the payment process by UNDP COs and respective IP  Extent to which funds flows were properly tracked, disbursed and monitored  Perception of UNDP COs regarding value for money of the respective IP initiatives | Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies  Opinions of Finance and Project managers in each country  Phase I and Phase II reports  IP reports for each respective country | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |
| 1. **Sustainability** | **4.1 What is the likelihood that project interventions are sustainable?** | 4.1.1 Are efforts being made to establish structures that will remain in place after the project/programme has been completed and which can be maintained without funding of the German Federal Foreign Office?  4.1.2 Is there any exit plan or exit strategies for activities continuity after the project? | Nature of structures that should remain in place after the end of the project  Nature of plans and activities put in place to ensure sustainability of the project | Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies  Opinions of Finance and Project managers in each country  Phase I and Phase II reports | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |
| **4.2 Are there any risks that may jeopardize the sustainability of project outputs?** | 4.2.1 To what extent will financial and economic resources be available to sustain the benefits achieved by the project?  4.2.2 Are there any social or political risks that may jeopardize sustainability of project outputs and the project’s contributions to regional programme outputs and outcomes?  4.2.3. Do the legal frameworks, policies and governance structures and processes within which the project operates pose risks that may jeopardize sustainability of project benefits? | Nature of financial or economic resources that could sustain the benefits of the project  Nature and risk of occurrence of social or political risks that may jeopardize sustainability of the project’s outputs and contributions  Extent to which legal frameworks, policies and governance may jeopardize sustainability of project benefits | Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies  Opinions of Finance and Project managers in each country  Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  IP reports for each respective country | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |
| **4.3. What is the risk that the level of stakeholders’ ownership will be sufficient to allow for the project benefits to be sustained?** | 4.3.1 To what extent do mechanisms, procedures and policies exist to allow primary stakeholders to carry forward the results attained on gender equality, empowerment of women, human rights and human development?  4.3.2 To what extent do stakeholders support the project’s long-term objectives?  4.3.3. How strong is the level of ownership of the Joint Stabilization Projects outputs by the Lake Chad Basin Government and beneficiary communities?  4.3.4 What is the level of stated commitment by the government and beneficiary community in sustaining the Stabilization Projects outputs/outcomes and continue working for sustaining/enhancing the impact? | Nature of policies and initiatives that could be undertaken to carry forward results attained on gender equality, empowerment of women and human rights  Extent to which stakeholders are willing to support the project’s long-term objectives  Perceptions of the level of ownership and commitment towards Joint Stabilization Projects outputs by the LBC Government and beneficiary communities | Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies  Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  IP reports for each respective country | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |
| **4.4. To what extent do UNDP interventions have well-designed and well-planned exit strategies?** | 4.4.1 Has the Projects partnership strategy been appropriate, effective and contributed to sustainable impact?  4.4.2 What could be done to strengthen exit strategies and sustainability? | Extent to which the project’s partnership strategy is perceived to be appropriate and effective  Nature of initiatives that could strengthen exit strategies and sustainability | Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies  Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  IP reports | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |
| **4.5 Lessons learnt** | 4.5.1 Have some lessons learnt been transferred to partners, including local governments, in order to strengthen long-term sustainability?  4.5.2 What lessons learnt need to inform future stabilization and/or post conflict recovery interventions? | Extent to which UNDP COs have been able to transfer lessons learnt to regional/national/local IP and officials  Nature of the lessons learnt that can support future stabilization programming in the region and elsewhere | Opinions of Donor, UNDP COs and LCB officials as well as CSOs and other constituencies  Phase I and Phase II reports  National Stock-Taking reports  IP reports for each respective country | Documentary review  Phone/Skype interviews with UNDP, CSO, constituencies and beneficiaries |

1. List of individuals or groups interviewed or consulted

| **Country** | **Name** | **Position** | **Region** | **Organization** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Tchad | GUELMBANG DJERANDOUBAM Gérald | Field Coordinator - UNDP | Bol | UNDP |
| Tchad | BARRO Lacina | UNDP- Resilience and stabilization specialist | N’Djamena | UNDP |
| Tchad | RIRANGAR Aimé | Gouvernance unit chief - UNDP | N’Djamena | UNDP |
| Tchad | DJINGAR Gaspard | Province Gen. Sec. |  | GOVERNMENT |
| Tchad | ADOUM ISSA Hassane | Gen. Sec. of the “Union des Artisans” | Bol | COMMUNITY |
| Tchad | KELEY ISSAKHA Idriss | Maire 1er Adjoint de Bol | Bol | GOVERNMENT |
| Nigeria | YOKOI Mizuho | UNDP Nigeria-NE sub office |  | UNDP |
| Nigeria | TOR-BEM Roy | Project associate-UNDP | Maiduguri | UNDP |
| Cameroon | MORIER Florian | Head of stabilization unit – UNDP | Maroua | UNDP |
| Cameroon | KOUEMO Tony | Monitoring and evaluation specialist - UNDP | Maroua | UNDP |
| Niger | RIBA TANKARI Aissa | Responsible on resource availability and mobilization |  | UNDP |
| Niger | SAWADOGO Hati Raymond | Regional consultant in Diffa | Diffa | AFD Niger |
| Niger | BALDE Abdoulaye | Main technique advisor – Peace and security program UNDP | Niamey | UNDP |
| Niger | HAIDARA Abdoulaye | Director of territory administration – Ministère de l’intérieur |  | GOVERNEMENT |

1. List of supporting documents reviewed.

**This preliminary bibliography has been prepared by the Management of the Evaluation.** **It will be imperative for each respective UNDP Office to complete it with additional documentation: CO reports, partners reports, contextual analysis, etc.**

**Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)**

A stock-take of Screening, Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (SPRR) of persons formerly associated with Boko Haram in **Cameroon** in the context of a harmonised LCBC SPRR approach for countries affected by the Boko Haram crisis, Provisional report, February 2020

A stock-take of Screening, Prosecution, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (SPRR) of persons formerly associated with the Boko Haram in **Nigeria** in the context of a harmonised LCBC SPRR approach for countries affected by the Boko Haram crisis, no date

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État des lieux du Profilage, de la Poursuite, de la Réhabilitation et de la Réintégration des personnes formellement associées à Boko Haram au **Niger**, dans le contexte d’une approche harmonisée de « SPRR » (PPRR) de la Commission du Bassin du Lac Tchad (CBLT) pour les pays affectés par la crise de Boko Haram, Mars 2020

Regional Consultative Forum with Civil Society Organizations, including Women and Youth, Traditional and Religious Leaders and Academics of the Lake Chad Basin Region, 18-20 June 2019, Niamey, Niger

Second Meeting of the Lake Chad Basin Governor’s Forum, 17-19 July 2019, Final Report, Niamey, Niger

**UNDP**

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Application for an allocation from federal Foreign Office Funds for the support of crisis prevention, stabilisation, peacebuilding, and mediation projects implemented by international and non-governmental organisation, Integration Regional Stabilisation of the Lake Chad Basin (Phase II), 27 November 2018

Final Report on Integrated Regional Stabilization of the Lake Chad Basin, Reporting Period: Sept 2017 – Dec.2018

Progress Report on Integrated Regional Stabilization Project for the Boko Haram affected Countries of the Lake Chad Basin, Reporting period: January-June 2019

Progress Report on Integrated Regional Stabilization Project for the Boko Haram affected Countries of the Lake Chad Basin (Phase II) Project (Updated), Reporting period: July-December 2019

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6. See for example, *Evaluation of UNDP Reintegration Programs*, by Yvan CONOIR and Paul BONARD, February 2013, <https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/6983> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. Application… op.cited, p 18 and following [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
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